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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Artificial Insemination Heterologous and the Matrimonial Offense of
Adultery in the United Kingdom
Professor Hager's analysis' of problems incidental to the practice
of artificial insemination discussed the controversial legal question
whether artificial insemination heterologous2 constitutes the matrimonial offense of adultery. It may be of value to supplement his
reference to American and Canadian authorities by some discussion
of the attitudes adopted on this issue by lawyers and courts in the
United Kingdom.
Justice Vaisey and H. U. Willink, K.C., the legal representatives
of a commission appointed in 1948 by the Archbishop of Canterbury to investigate the theological, ethical, sociological and legal
aspects of artificial human insemination, expressed no doubt that
the perpetration of A.I.D. legally would constitute adultery on the
part of both the married donor and the married recipient.' However, in debate in the House of Lords in March 1949, Lord Merriman, President of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of
the English High Court, roundly criticized this opinion as "absolute nonsense." 4 The conclusion of the commissioners was based
5
primarily upon the decision of Justice Orde in Orford v. Orford
and a dictum of Lord Dunedin in Russell v. Russell.' In the latter
case the learned law Lord stated :7 "The appellant conceived and
had a child without penetration having ever been effected by any
man. ...
The jury... came to the conclusion that she had been
'Hager, Artificial Insemination: Some Practical Considerations for
Effective Counseling, 39 N.C.L. REV. 217, 232-35 (1961).
' Artificial insemination heterologous is the technical term applied to instances where the seminal fluid to be used must be taken from a male other
than the husband of the recipient. This technique is more popularly known

as artificial insemination donor, see Hager, supra note 1, at 222-23, and will
be referred to hereinafter as A.I.D.
'ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY'S COMMISSION ON ARTIFICIAL HUMAN
INSEMINATION, REPORT ON ARTIFICIAL HUMAN INSEMINATION 37 (London,

1948).
'161 H.L. DEB. (5th ser.) 410 (1949). Two eminent Lord Chancellors,
Lord Jowitt and Lord Kilmuir, have also regarded A.I.D. as falling outside
of adultery.

161 H.L. DEB. (5th ser.) 511 (1950); 207 H.L. DEB. (5th

ser.) 982, 1008 (1958).
[1921] 49 Ont. L.R. 15, [1921] 58 D.L.R. 251.
[1924] A.C. 687.
7
Id. at 721.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

fecundated ab extra by another man unknown, and fecundation ab
extra is, I doubt not, adultery."
A liberal interpretation of this dictum would suggest that adultery is not confined to a mutual surrender of the sexual organs but
extends to a mutual surrender of the reproductive faculties by means
of artificial insemination. Such an interpretation, however, divorces
the statement from its context for it totally ignores the circumstances in respect of which Lord Dunedin's opinion was expressed.
The fecundation ab extra referred to in Russell resulted not from
artificial insemination but from certain acts of intimacy which fell
short of a penetration of the female sexual organ.
The direct question whether A.I.D. constituted adultery was considered comparatively recently by the Scottish Court of Session in
Maclennan v. Maclennan.' The facts of this case may be briefly
summarized. The husband petitioned for divorce on the ground of
his wife's adultery. The wife alleged that the child to whom she
had given birth had been conceived as a result of her artificial insemination with the seed of a donor. The husband contended that
this defense was irrelevant since A.I.D. was adultery in the eyes
of the law, and further maintained that he did not consent to his
wife's impregnation. After stating that specification of the time
and place of the alleged artificial insemination was necessary to the
admissibility of the wife's defense, the court, in a preliminary judgment by Lord Wheatley, ruled that A.I.D. did not constitute
adultery.9 It was conceded by the court that a married woman
committed a grave and heinous offense against the marriage contract by submitting to artificial insemination without her husbands
consent. Nevertheless, this was considered a matter in respect of
which the legislature should determine an appropriate remedy and
was deemed quite irrelevant to the issue before the court. Following a careful analysis of the authorities, including Doornbos v.
Doornbos,0 Russell v. Russell" and Clark (otherwise Talbot) v.
' [1958] Sess. Cas. 105, [1958] Scots L.T.R. 12.
'An adjournment was granted to allow entry of the necessary amendments to the wife's defense. Counsel subsequently intimated to the court
that the defendant had declined to provide the information needed to cure
the defect in the pleadings; accordingly the court sustained the plaintiff's
plea that the defense was irrelevant and sent the case to the undefended roll.
1023 U.S.L. WEEK 2308 (1954), discussed in Rossman & Allen, What's
New in the Law, 41 A.B.A.J. 263 (1955); Tallin, Artificial Insemination,
34 CAx. B. REv. 1, 14-15 (1956).
"[1924] A.C. 687.
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Clark,2 Lord Wheatley observed :"s
[I] t seems possible to derive [from the cases] the following propositions, according at least to the law of England.
1. For adultery to be committed there must be the two
parties physically present and engaging in the sexual act
at the same time.
2. To constitute the sexual act there must be an act of
union involving some degree of penetration of the female
organ by the male organ.
3. It is not a necessary concomitant of adultery that male
seed should be deposited in the female's ovum.
4. The placing of the male seed in the female ovum need
not necessarily result from the sexual act, and if it does not,
but is placed there by some other means, there is no sexual
intercourse.
I appreciate that the second of these findings does not
square with Lord Dunedin's obiter dictum in Russell, which
seems to conflict with the decision of Pilcher, J., in Clark
, but even on Lord Dunedin's standard, the physical
presence of the male organ and its close proximity and
juxtaposition to the female organ seem to me to be essential
ingredients of the act.
This opinion no doubt represents a rational judgment to the
person who views intent as the essence of adultery.'4 To the matrimonial lawyer, however, it may reflect too rigid acceptance of the
concept of adultery, the foundation of English divorce laws, in that
it denies opportunity for the courts to afford legal recognition to
a socially existing fact, namely, a broken marriage.
The decision of Lord Wheatly was the subject of debate in the
House of Lords in February 1958, and in September of that year
a departmental committee was appointed "to enquire into the exist2 [1943] 2 All E.R. 540 (P.D.A.). In this case Pilcher, J., held that
the marriage in issue had never been consummated despite the wife's fecundation ab extra by her husband.
" Maclennan v. Maclennan, [1958] Sess. Cas. 105, 113, [1958] Scots
L.T.R. 12, 17.

"'See generally Guttmacher, The Legitimacy of Artificial Insemination,

11 HUMAN FERTIL. 16, 17 (1946): "From the physician's point of view
it is the intent which is all important. Adultery and artificial insemination

are actually the absolute antithesis of each other. One is done clandestinely

to deceive and enjoy carnal pleasure; the other decently and frankly to
beget offspring without the emotional and physical enjoyment of coitus."
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ing practice of human artificial insemination and its legal consequences and to consider whether, taking account of the interests
of individuals involved and society as a whole, any change in the
law is necessary or desirable." In its report,"; which was presented
to Parliament at Westminster in July 1960, the committee expressed
the general conclusion that A.I.D. should neither be prohibited nor
even regulated by law. In the context of matrimonial law it accepted the view previously adopted by the Royal Commission on
Marriage and Divorce, 1951-195516 that a clear distinction be
drawn between artificial insemination and adultery. The departmental committee 17 endorsed the recommendation of the Royal
Commission that artificial insemination of the wife without the
consent of her husband be made a new and separate ground of
divorce or judicial separation. It further recommended that such
a course of conduct on the part of a wife should entitle the husband
to take proceedings in the magistrate's courts for a separation order.
It should be observed that the committee made no recommendation providing a matrimonial remedy for the wife whose husband
donated semen for purposes of artificial insemination. This omission is unfortunate insofar as it reintroduces inequality between the
sexes before the law. There are, of course, certain practical difficulties which impede the application of similar recommendations to
the husband donor for, under present conditions, the anonymity
which surrounds the donor's identity will generally preclude discovery of the offense by the wife. Although this particular difficulty might be met by statutory control or regulation of the practice of artificial insemination, other difficult legal problems would
remain. For example, would the husband be penalized where his
donation was made before marriage but utilized subsequent thereto?
The present inaction of Parliament at Westminster indicates a
reluctance to legislate in this controversial province of law. Consequently, the judiciary remains confronted with the unenviable task
of resolving legal issues pertaining to artificial insemination without
any prior legislative determination of general policy considerations.
JULIAN D. PAYNE*
15

Human Artificial Insemination Committee, First Report, CAID. No.

1105, at 263 (1960).

" Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce, First Report, CMD. No.
9678, at 90 (1956).
Human Artificial Insemination Committee, supra note 15, at 115-17.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon,
Canada.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
Constitutional Law-Search and Seizure-Electronic Listening
Devices
In Olmstead v. United States,' the United States Supreme Court
stated that the fourth amendment 2 was not violated "unless there had
been an official search and seizure of [a person], or such a seizure
of his papers or his tangible material effects, or an actual physical
invasion of his house 'or curtilage' for the purpose of making a
seizure." In this case the Court held that incriminating telephone
conversations obtained by federal officers by tapping the defendant's
telephone line were not obtained in violation of the search and seizure
clause of the fourth amendment since there had been no physical
The same rationale was
invasion of the defendant's premises.'
applied and a like result reached in Goldman v. United States4 where
the incriminating evidence was obtained by placing a detectaphone
against the outer wall of the defendant's office so that police officers
could hear conversations inside the office. And in On Lee v. United
States,5 incriminating evidence was obtained through the use of a
cleverly concealed miniature microphone on an undercover agent
who was admitted into the defendant's shop. The incriminating
evidence was transmitted through the microphone to another agent
outside the shop. The Court held this evidence admissible, stating
that this did not amount to an unlawful invasion of individual
privacy.
A similar question was presented in the recent case of Silverman
v. United States.' District of Columbia police officers suspected
that the defendants were using their row house as headquarters for
a gambling operation. After securing permission from the owner,
the officers went into an adjoining row house and installed an
electronic listening device, a "spike mike," in order to obtain in1277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
' "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
'This case was decided prior to the passage of the Federal Communications Act which provides that "no person not being authorized by the sender
shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence,
contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communiations. . . ." 48 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §605 (1958). The
Court has appliect this section of the act to prohibit the admission in federal
courts of evidence procured by wire-tapping. E.g., Nardone v. United
States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
'316 U.S. 129 (1942).
5343 U.S. 747 (1952).
°365 U.S. 505 (1961).
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criminating evidence. The instrument used was a composite microphone, amplifier, power pack and earphone attached to a one-foot
spike. It was inserted into the common wall7 of the two houses
until it struck the heating duct serving the defendants' house. The
District Court for the District of Columbia allowed the police
officers, over the objections of the defendants, to describe conversations which they had overheard by means of the listening apparatus.
The defendants were convicted and the court of appeals affirmed.
The Supreme Court reversed.
The Supreme Court refused to re-examine the fine distinction
drawn in Olmstead, requiring a physical invasion of one's house as
the basis for declaring a search and seizure unlawful under the
fourth amendment. Instead, the Court based its decision entirely
upon the ground that in the instant case "the eavesdropping was
accomplished by means of an unauthorized physical penetration into
the premises occupied by the [defendants]," ' and was, therefore,
violative of their rights under the fourth amendment to be free from
an unreasonable search and seizure.
Although consistent with the rationale of Olmstead and its application in Goldman and On Lee, the significance of the decision in
Silverman can be. fully appreciated only by taking cognizance of the
fact that the Court did not base its decision on a "technical trespass
under the local property law relating to party walls" ;9 rather, the
"physical penetration" emphasized by the Court was the usurpation
of a part of the defendants' house, the heating system, which "became in effect a giant microphone, running through the entire house
occupied by the [defendants]."'"
In a concurring opinion, Mr.
Justice Douglas stated:
An electronic device on the outside wall of a house is a
permissible invasion of privacy ... while an electronic device
that penetrates the wall, as here, is not. Yet the invasion of
privacy is as great in one case as in the other. The concept
of "an unauthorized physical penetration into the premises,"
SThe common wall (or party wall) was thirteen to fourteen inches thick.
The defendants argued that the spike penetrated the wall to such a depth that
it entered into their half of the wall by as much as five-sixteenths of an inch,
hence, a "trespass" in violation of their rights of privacy under the fourth

amendment. Silverman v. United States, 275 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
'Silverman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509 (1961).
2 Id. at 511. And see
note 8 supra.
ll Id. at 509.
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on which the present decision rests seems to me to be beside
the point ....

[O]ur sole concern should be with whether

the privacy of the home was invaded."
In seeking to persuade the Court to reconsider its decisions in
Olmstead, Goldman, and On Lee, the defendants brought to its attention various modern electronic devices which could be used to
monitor conversations without an actual physical penetration into
one's house or office. 12 However, the Court stated that the decision
should be based on the the unauthorized physical penetration into the
defendant's house and that it need not "contemplate the Fourth
Amendment implications of ...

frightening paraphernalia which the

vaunted marvels of an electronic age may visit upon human society."' 3
The Court, by virtue of the peculiar facts of this case, had an
opportunity to lay aside a rule of law that has been outmoded by
scientific progress and to adhere to the fundamental premise that the
principles upon which the fourth amendment is predicated "apply to
all invasions on the part of the government and its employees of the
sanctities of a man's home and the privacies of life."' Mr. Justice
Brandeis long ago made this observation:
The progress of science in furnishing the Government with
means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping.
Ways may some day be developed by which the Government,
without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce
them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a
jury the most intimate occurrences of the home. Advances
in the psychic and related sciences may bring means of exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts, and emotions. Can it
1 Id. at
2These

512 (concurring opinion).
include a parabolic microphone, reportedly capable of picking up
sound from five hundred to one thousand feet away, an ultrasonic microphone
that picks up sound from a distance by way of an electronic beam, and a
radio microphone that can be "aimed" with a telescope and is capable of
sending its microwave beam up to one thousand feet and picking up sound.
For the more ambitious eavesdroppers there are closed circuit television
outfits. In addition to these highly technical devices there are automatic,
remote controlled and telescopic cameras, tiny recorders and a myriad assortment of concealable microphones. For a thorough technical description of
the entire gamut of such devices, see DASH, SCHWARTZ & KNOWLTON,
THE EAVESDROPPERS, 330-58 (1959).365 U.S. 505, 509 (1961).
1 Silverman v. United States,
"'Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (dictum). (Emphasis added.)
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be that the Constitution affords no protection against Mch
invasions of individual security.f'5
It is regretted that the Court in Silverman failed to give heed to
the warning sounded by Mr. Justice Brandeis. An intrusion by
stealth upon individual privacy by police officers should be unlawful
under the search and seizure clause of the fourth amendment whether
the intrusion be in form of an electronic or microwave beam, a
light wave, or a sound wave and regardless of the absence or presence
of a "physical invasion."
Indeed, one might even question whether in the principal case
the spike's touching the heating duct and thereby transforming it
into a sounding board was actually a physical invasion of the defendants' house. This is especially so in view of the Court's curt
dismissal of technical trespass property law as insignificant. Moreover, there would seem to be little difference between the "usurpation" of the heating system of a house by converting it into a "giant
microphone" and simply plucking from the air the sounds within a
house by means of an electronic device that may not even touch any
part of the house.
Should the Court discard the premise upon which Olmstead,
Goldman, On Lee and Silverman are based, the effect of such a
decision would undoubtedly be detrimental to the present practices
of police investigations and criminal prosecutions. But, as stated by
Mr. Justice Franfurter in a dissenting opinion in On Lee,'0 "criminal prosecution is more than a game. And in any event it should
not be deemed to be a dirty game in which 'the dirty business' of
criminals is outwitted by the 'the dirty business' of law officers."
THoMAS M. STARNES

Domestic Relations-Evidence-Presumption of Validity of Second
Marriage

It is generally held that where a marriage in fact has been proved
or admitted, the law raises a presumption that it is valid.' This rule
" Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (dissenting
opinion). (Emphasis added.)
U.S. 747, 758 (1952) (dissent).
'E.g., Gee Chee On v. Brownell, 253 F.2d 814 (5th Cir. 1958); Brooms
v. Brooms, 151 Cal. App. 2d 343, 311 P.2d 562 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957);
Whelan v. Whelan, 346 Ill. App. 445, 105 N.E.2d 314 (1952); Wilson v.
Mitchell, 10 Misc. 2d 559, 169 N.Y.S.2d 249 (Sup. Ct. 1957). See generally
Annot., 77 A.L.R. 729 (1932); Annot., 34 A.L.R. 464 (1925).
16343
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is applied without difficulty where only one marriage is in question.
However, if successive marriages of the same person are involved,
the situation becomes more complex in that the courts are confronted
with conflicting presumptions. 2 A great majority of jurisdictions'
in this situation follow the position taken in Parker v. American
Lumber Corp.4 where the court stated:
The decided weight of authority, and we think the correct
view, is that where two marriages of the same person are
shown, the second marriage is presumed to be valid; that
such presumption is stronger than and overcomes the presumption of the continuance of the first marriage, so that a
person who attacks a second marriage has the burden of
producing evidence of its invalidity. Where both parties to
the first marriage are shown to be living at the time of the
second marriage it is presumed in favor of the second marriage that the first was dissolved by divorce. These presumptions arise, it is said, because the law presumes morality
and legitimacy, not immorality and bastards.5
Although the presumption is of great value to the party for
whom it operates in that it places the burden of proving the invalidity of the second marriage on the party attacking it,' it has no additional value. Its effect is merely to invoke a rule of law compelling
the jury to reach a certain result in the absence of testimony to the
contrary." Thus the presumption is not conclusive, but may be rebutted by proof of a valid prior marriage and by proof that such
marriage has not been terminated by death or divorce.8
2 For example, the presumption of the continuance of a status, or condition, once proved to exist (here the first marriage) and the presumption of
the continuing life of the wife of the former marriage.
3
E.g., Ellenwood v. Ellenwood, 157 Fla. 640, 26 So. 2d 655 (1946); Rose
v. Rose, 274 Ky. 208, 118 S.W.2d 529 (1938); Davis v. Davis, 2 Wash. 2d
448, 101 P.2d 313 (1940).
'190
Va. 181, 56 S.E.2d 214 (1949).
5 Id. at 185,
56 S.E.2d at 216.
Gainey v. Gainey, 119 Cal. App. 2d 564, 259 P.2d 984 (Dist. Ct. App.
1953); Keller v. Linsenmyer, 101 N.J. Eq. 664, 139 Ati. 33 (Ct. Ch. 1927);
Williams v. Smith, 16 Misc. 2d 585, 184 N.Y.S.2d 176 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
Vaughan v. Vaughan, 195 Miss. 463, 16 So. 2d 23 (1943). See generally 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2491 (3d ed. 1940).
8
Hamburgh v. Hys, 22 Cal. App. 2d 508, 71 P.2d 301 (Dist. Ct. App.
1937). Although proving that a divorce has not taken place involves proof
of a negative, this task would seem to have been made considerably easier in
North Carolina by the enactment of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130-52.1 (1958),
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In Kearney v. Thomas9 North Carolina adopted the majority
view of presuming the second marriage to be valid. It was there
stated that the majority view was "so abundantly supported by well
considered cases, so consonant with reason, and so consistent with
analogous practices, as to justify its adoption."'"
In the recent case of Williams v. Williams," however, the court
refused to hold that upon proof of a subsequent marriage a presumption of its validity was raised. In this case A, the admitted
first wife of W, the decedent, petitioned the court that she be allotted
dower in his lands. Thereafter B filed an interplea in which she
alleged that she was the surviving widow. In support of her claim
B introduced evidence of a certificate authorizing the marriage and
of its return showing that the marriage ceremony had been performed. She also offered evidence to the effect that until W's death
they had lived together as man and wife for nearly five and one-half
years, and that her name appeared on his death certificate as the
surviving spouse. Instead of presuming B's marriage valid upon
this proof, the court held that the burden was upon her to show that
W's prior marriage to A, which was admitted to be valid, had
been invalidated or dissolved.
The court justified its decision on the grounds that the intervenor has the burden of proving his case and establishing the rights
claimed,' and that one who asserts a property right which is dependent upon the invalidity of a marriage must make good his cause
by proof.' 3 However, there would seem to be no reason why an
intervenor could not be aided by the operation of presumptions.14
By failing to recognize the presumption, the court has clearly failed
to give the intervenor the benefit of the rule announced in the
which provides for the central registration of all divorces granted by the
North Carolina courts.
p225 N.C. 156, 33 S.E.2d 871 (1945). In this case the plaintiffs, children
of the first marriage, were heirs at law of Alexander Kearney. The defendant was the second wife. Plaintiffs contended that the property which
was the subject of the suit descended to them on the death of their father
free of any dower claim of the defendant because the second marriage was
bigamous
and, therefore, void.
10Id.at
164, 33 S.E.2d at 877.
11254 N.C. 729, 120 S.E.2d 68 (1961).
12Id.
at 730, 120 S.E.2d at 69.
Id. at 731, 120 S.E.2d at 70.
1,In Parker v. American Lumber Corp., 190 Va. 181, 56 S.E.2d 214
(1949), the court allowed the plaintiff the benefit of the presumption. Forr
the purpose of determining the availability of presumptions there would
seem to be no difference between a plaintiff and an intervenor.

19611
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Kearney case that "proof of the second marriage adduced by the
defendant, if sufficient to establish it before the jury, raises a presumption of its validity, upon which property rights growing out
'15
of its validity may be based."

The court attempted to distinguish this decision from the Kearney
case on the ground that in Kearney, the death of the first wife
being admitted, the question before the court was whether or not
the evidence was sufficient to be submitted to the jury upon the
validity of a subsequent marriage. The validity of this distinction
is questionable. In Kearney the court stated that the question before it was whether the burden of the issues submitted to the jury
was properly placed on the plaintiffs or on the defendant. This
would seem to be the substance of the problem before the court in the
Williams case. Moreover, in Kearney the first wife was alive at the
time of the subsequent marriage although it was admitted that she
was dead at the time suit was brought. Both cases, therefore, involved a second marriage while the first wife was alive. One factual
distinction between the cases is that in the Kearney case the defendant was seeking to establish the second marriage rather than
the intervenor as in Williams. However, the position of the parties
to the suit would not seem to be determinative of whether the presumption applies.
Furthermore, there would seem to be better grounds for applying
the presumption in Williams than in Kearney. In Williams the
first wife was a party to the suit and was present to give evidence
rebutting the presumption, but in Kearney the first wife was not
-- 225 N.C. 156, 163-64, 33 S.E.2d 871, 876-77 (1945). As to the amount
of proof necessary to raise the presumption, the court in this case stated: "It
is to be noted here that the existence, or fact, of the second marriage was
supported not only by reputation and cohabitation, but by the direct evidence
of the defendant as to the ceremony of marriage, and by the certified copies
challenged by the plaintiffs." Id. at 164, 33 S.E.2d at 877. In refusing to
allow the presumption in Forbes v. Burgess, 158 N.C. 131, 73 S.E. 792
(1912), the court said: "Although where a marriage is established by a proof
of the fact in any competent way, it raises a presumption that any prior
marriage which is relied on to invalidate the second marriage has been
dissolved by death or divorce, the presumption of death or divorce will not be
indulged in favor of an alleged second marriage, the proof of which rests
only on cohabitation and reputation." Id. at 133, 73 S.E. at 792-93.
The proof offered in the principal case consisted of more than proof of
cohabitation and reputation; in fact it was almost the same as that offered in

the Kearney case. Therefore, applying the standard prescribed by these
two cases, it would seem that the proof was sufficient to raise the presumption.
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present. Thus in Kearney the court put the burden of proving the
validity and continued existence of the first marriage upon parties
who did not have personal knowledge of the facts, but in Williams
it refused to place the burden on the party who did have personal
knowledge.
If the court is basing its refusal to allow the intervenor the
benefit of the presumption because she is an intervenor rather than
a defendant, the court is putting unwarranted stress on who gets
to court first and instigates the suit. The fact that the second wife
has gone through the requisite marriage ceremony and has lived
with a man as his wife for several years without any objection from
his former wife should have the same significance regardless of
whether she is the plaintiff, defendant or intervenor. If, on the
other hand, the court is refusing to allow the intevenor the benefit
of the presumption because it has decided to no longer afford the
second marriage a presumption of validity, the court, as stated in the
dissenting opinion in Williams, should expressly overrule the
Kearney case and specifically state what the law is in this state.
Regardless of why the court in Williams failed to give the benefit of the presumption to the intervenor, the better policy would
seem to be to uniformly place the burden on the party attacking the
validity of the second marriage. Not only does public policy'0
dictate that the second marriage be presumed valid, but also the
first wife is in a better position to give evidence about the contract
to which she is a party than the second wife. Thus it is hoped
that at its next opportunity the court will make clear that the presumption of validity of the second marriage, as adopted in the
Kearney case, is available to all parties, regardless of their position
in the action.
H.

MORRISON JOHNSTON, JR.

Federal Jurisdiction-Diversity of Citizenship-Corporation's
Principal Place of Business-Multiple Incorporation
In Kelly v. United States Steel Corp.' the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals was called upon for the first time to interpret the term
"principal place of business" as used in the diversity jurisdiction
" Marriage being an accepted and desirable social institution, the court
should favor the parties alleging the marriage by presuming them innocent
of bigamy and by presuming the children by the union legitimate.
1284 F.2d 850 (3d Cir. 1960).
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statute.' The plaintiff initiated action in the federal district court
alleging diversity of citizenship as the grounds for jurisdiction. The
complaint alleged that the plaintiff was a citizen of Pennsylvania
and the defendant a Delaware corporation with its principal place
of business in New York. The defendant sought dismissal for want
of jurisdiction claiming that diversity of citizenship was lacking in
that Pennsylvania, and not New York, was its principal place of
business. The district court dismissed the action for want of jurisdiction. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed.
The sole question before the court was the location of the defendant's principal place of business. In determining this, the court
pointed out that it was a question of fact to be determined by the
court, and that what facts were significant and determinative in
this matter were left to the court's discretion.' However, it was
considered unsound to attempt to find a single factor or criterion by
which the question of the principal place of business could be determined. The court proposed that the proper method was to analyze
the question and attempt to select, after an examination of the entire
corporate structure, the combination of factors which pointed to some
one place as the principal place of business.
The plaintiff introduced evidence4 which showed that final approval of over-all corporate policy and financial matters was made
by the board of directors from the New York offices. It was contended that this, along with other similar activities carried on in the
New York executive offices, was sufficient to establish New York as
the defendant's principal place of business.
However, after an examination of all phases of the corporation's
activities, the court concluded that the occasional meeting of the
policy making directors in New York was not sufficient to establish
this site as the defendant's principal place of business. The court
held that Pennsylvania, where the corporate policy was actually
' "For the purposes of this section and section 1441 of this title, a
corporation shall be deemed a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business."
72 Stat. 415, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1958).
'"The conclusion that certain facts are or are not helpful in deciding the
question is a question of legal standard, or legal concept, and is one for a
court to decide as a question of law." 284 F.2d at 852.
' Upon challenge of the jurisdiction, the party invoking federal jurisdiction must prove that the requisite jurisdictional facts are present. Metro
Industrial Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 181 F. Supp. 130
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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formulated and where the business activities were centered, was the
principal place of business.
While the exercise of co-ordination and direction of corporate
policy and affairs from Pennsylvania was the apparent basis of the
decision, the court did not disregard the physical operations of the
corporation. The location of the majority of the corporate assets
and steel production in Pennsylvania, while of lesser importance than
the control factors previously mentioned, was considered by the court
to lend weight to the finding that Pennsylvania was the principal
place of business.
The Kelly case is a good example of the difficulty which the courts
may encounter in determining the principal place of business, especially when considering a gigantic corporation such as United States
Steel Corporation. Therefore, resulting decisions are often, admittedly, somewhat artificial. 5 While the question of the principal place
of business has long been of significance in the bankruptcy law,0 it is
only since the 1958 amendment of the Judicial Code that this concept has become important in the field of federal jurisdiction.
Prior to the 1958 amendment, the law was well established that
a corporation for diversity purposes 'was a citizen of the state in
which it was incorporated.7 In 1958, pressured by an everincreasing case load in the federal courts,' Congress enacted the new
284 F.2d at 853.
The test of the "principal place of business" is one of the jurisdictional
criterion for the bankruptcy courts. Bankruptcy Act, 66 Stat. 420 (1952),

11 U.S.C. § 11 (1958).

' Originally the term "citizen" as used in the federal constitution was not
interpreted to include corporations. Bank of the United States v. Deveaux,
9 U.S. (5 Cranch.) 61 (1809); Hope Ins. Co. v. Boardman, 9 U.S. (5
Cranch.) 57 (1809) ; Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch.) 267 (1806).
But in Louisville, C. & C. R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844),
the Court held that a corporation was deemed a citizen of the state in which
it was incorporated regardless of the citizenship of the stockholders.
Corporate citizenship underwent a final change in Marshall v. Baltimore &
0. R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1853), where it was held that the stockholders of the corporation were conclusively presumed to be citizens of the
state in which the corporation was incorporated. This fiction of the corporate citizenship continued until the 1958 amendment.
8"In the years following World War II the judicial business of the
United States district courts increased tremendously. Total civil cases filed
are up 75 percent and the private civil business has more than doubled in the
districts having exclusively Federal jurisdiction. Most of the increase has
occurred in the diversity of citizenship cases, which have increased from
7,286 in 1941 to 20,524 in 1956. A large portion of this caseload involves
corporations. Of the 20,524 diversity of citizenship cases filed in the district
courts during fiscal 1956 corporations were parties in 12,732 cases, or 62
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diversity provision, the effect of which was to give some corporations dual citizenship. Under the statute a corporation is; a citizen
of both the state of its incorporation and the state in which its principal place of business is located.
The new citizenship in the state of the corporation's principal
"place of business was created to eliminate the evil of a local business
bringing its litigations into the federal courts simply because it was
incorporated in some other state. It was hoped that by enlarging the
corporation's citizenship the number of corporate cases in which
jurisdiction was based on diversity could be decreased. 9
In adopting the criterion of .the principal place of business as one
of the means of conferring corporate citizenship, Congress was not
creating a new concept, but was in fact adopting the term from the
bankruptcy statute."° It was believed that by using this standard
many of the problems of interpretation could be avoided because
the courts would find sufficient guidance in the interpretation of the
phrase in the bankruptcy cases in which the location of the principal
place of business had been in issue." But by examining the bankruptcy cases, it will be seen that Congress: could hardly have selected
a more confusing term.
It is stated in the bankruptcy cases' 2 that what constitutes the
principal place of business is a question of fact to be determined in
each particular case. Thus, being a question of fact, the nature of
the corporate business and its activities must be considered.' 3 As
to this the bankruptcy cases are in harmony. But in determining the
principal place of business, the bankruptcy cases have derived two
distinct tests based upon a consideration of two different types
of evidence. One line of cases' 4 holds that the principal place of
percent." S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3100 (1958).
Id. at 3101-02.
"0Bankruptcy Act, 66 Stat. 420 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 11 (1958).
1 S.REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws
3100, 3102 (1958).
"2E.g., It re Hudson River Nay. Corp., 59 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1932) ; It
re Diamond Star Timber Corp., 64 F. Supp. 849 (N.D.N.Y. 1946); In re
DeSoto Crude Oil Purchasing Corp., 35 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. La. 1940).
"E.g., It re Diamond Star Timber Corp., supra note 12; In re Devonian
Mineral Spring Co., 272 Fed. 527 (N.D. Ohio 1920); In re Worcester
Footwear Co., 251 Fed. 760 (D. Mass. 1918).
"E.g., Shearin v. Cortez Oil Co., 92 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1937); In re

Guanacevi Tunnel Co., 201 Fed. 316 (2d Cir. 1912); It re Portex Oil Co.,
30 F. Supp. 138 (D. Ore. 1939); In re American & British Mfg. Corp., 300
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business is where the home office or nerve center of the corporation
is located, while other cases 5 have taken the position that it is where
the actual operations of the corporation are carried on.
Under the home office or nerve center test the location of the
principal place of business is held to be the same as that of the main
or central office of the corporation from which radiates the power
and control over all corporate activities. 6 In determining this focal
point of corporate activities, the location of the managing offices,
stockholder's meetings, board meetings, executives, books and
records, and banking activities, are all significant factors, although
no one factor is conclusive evidence of the principal place of business.
Under the actual operations test the court first determines what
the principal business of the corporation actually is 1 7 and then considers the location of the facilities needed to carry on this primary
activity.'" The site of these facilities is deemed the principal place
of business. The location of factories, personnel, production equipment, mines and quarries are the prime objects with which the court
is concerned. The location of control over these physical assets is
only secondary.
While Congress made it clear that it was permissible for the
courts, when applying the jurisdictional test of the principal place of
business, to be guided by the standards established in the bankruptcy cases, they failed to indicate which of the two tests should be
applied. In examining the cases decided since the 1958 diversity
provision went into effect, in which the main issue has been the
determination of the principal place of business, it will be seen that
the courts have, at various times, adopted both of the bankruptcy
tests.
Fed. 839 (D. Conn. 1924); In re Worcester Footwear Co., supra note 13;
In re Matthews Consol. Slate Co., 144 Fed. 724 (D. Mass. 1905).
" E.g., In re Pusey & Jones Co., 286 Fed. 88 (2d Cir. 1922); Dryden
v. Ranger Ref. & Pipe Line Co., 280 Fed. 257 (5th Cir. 1922); Continental
Coal Corp. v. Roszelle Bros., 242 Fed. 243 (6th Cir. 1917); Watters v. Hamilton Gas Co., 10 F. Supp. 323 (S.D. W. Va. 1935); In re Tygarts River
Coal Co., 203 Fed. 178 (N.D. W. Va. 1913).
" In re Matthews Consol. Slate Co., 144 Fed. 724 (D. Mass. 1905) ; See
generally 1 COLLIER, BAXRUPTCYZ § 2.19(2) (14th ed. 1956).
"'E.g., In re Tygarts River Coal Co., 203 Fed. 178 (N.D. W. Va. 1913);
In re Elmira Steel Co., 109 Fed. 456 (N.D.N.Y. 1901).
" In re Tygarts River Coal Co., supra note 17; See generally 1 COLIER,
op. cit. supra note 16.
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Scot Typewriter Co. v. Underwood Corp. 9 is the best example
of an application of the home office test. The defendant was a Delaware corporation engaged in manufacturing, distributing and
selling typewriters and business machines. The defendant's manufacturing plants were located in Connecticut, New Jersey and California, and sales offices were located in virtually all other states.
However, its executive offices, from which the over-all supervision
and co-ordination of sales and production, as well as a determination
of corporate policy originated, were in New York. Under these facts
the court applied the home office test and held that New York
was the defendant's principal place of business. The court stated :2o
Where a corporation is engaged in far-flung and varied activities which are carried on in different states, its principal
place of business is the nerve center from which it radiates
out to its constituent parts and from which its officers direct,
control and coordinate all activities without regard to locale,
in the furtherance of the corporate objective.
An excellent example of an application of the actual operations
test is found in Mattson v. Cuyuna Ore Co.2 The defendant corporation carried on extensive mining operations in Minnesota. All the
mining property, personnel and equipment were located in Minnesota. However, the home office and chief executives of the corporation were in Ohio, and the business transaction out of which the
litigation arose originated from these Ohio offices. It was the
court's view that the home office was a mere incident to the corporation's existence, and that the principal place of business was that
place where the corporation's actual mining operations were carried
22

on.

While it is true that under the fact situation presented in Kelly
the resulting determination of the principal place of business would
have been the same regardless of which test was used, there was in
"0 170 F. Supp. 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
Id. at 865. For other cases applying the "home office test" see Textron
Electronics, Inc. v. Unholtz-Dickie Corp., 193 F. Supp. 456 (D. Conn. 1961);
Wear-Ever Alum., Inc. v. Sipos, 184 F. Supp. 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Hughes
v. United Eng'rs & Constructors, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1959);
Riley v. Gulf, M. & 0. R.R., 173 F. Supp. 416 (S.D. Ill. 1959).
" 180 F. Supp. 743 (D. Minn. 1960).
" For other cases applying the "actual operations" test see Gilardi v.
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 189 F. Supp. 82 (N.D. Ill. 1960); Potocni v. Asco
Mining Co., 186 F. Supp. 912 (W.D. Pa. 1960); Webster v. Wilke, 186 F.
Supp. 199 (S.D. Ill. 1960).
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Kelly a definite attempt to reject any single criterion as the sole test
for the principal place of business. However, in two recent decisions
the Kelly case has been construed as following both the actual operations and the nerve center tests. In Potocni v. Asco Mining Co. 2 3
the court applied the actual operations test and claimed to rely upon
24
the then unreported decision of Kelly v. United States Steel Corp.,
while in Textron Electronics, Inc. v. Unholtz-Dickie Corp., 5 the
court viewed Kelly as an application of the nerve center test in spite
of the court's language repudiating this test.26 Therefore, considering the manner in which the district courts have interpreted the
Kelly case, it is doubtful that the bankruptcy tests will be discarded,
but in all probability these tests will continue to be the basis of future
decisions.
The problem of determining the principal place of business is
not the only difficulty the courts in the future will encounter. The
question of the citizenship of the multi-state corporation and the
effect the new statute will have on this citizenship is as yet undecided.
In the early cases27 decided under the new diversity provision it
was held that when a corporation had its principal place of business
in a state other than the state of incorporation, the corporation
would have dual citizenship; and if either of the citizenships coincided with that of the adverse party, there was no diversity within

the meaning of the statute. In reaching this result the courts have
emphasized the two following points: (1) the intention of the legislature was to limit jurisdiction, not broaden it; and (2) the statute
clearly provides that a corporation is a citizen of the state of in28
corporation and the state of its principal place of business.
186 F. Supp. 912 (W.D. Pa. 1960).
"Iam in accord with the view expressed by my associate, Judge Joseph
P. Willson, that the state wherein a corporation carries on its chief operations is the principal place of business of that corporation, Kelly v. United
States Steel Corporation, Ca17251, filed February 17, 1960, officially unreported." Id. at 912-13.
2

2

26

193 F. Supp. 456 (D. Conn. 1961).

Id. at 459.

2 Canton v. Angelina Cas. Co., 279 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1960); Buck
v. New York C. R.R., 275 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1960); Webster v. Wilke, 186
F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Ill. 1960); Mattson v. Cuyuna Ore Co., 180 F. Supp.
743 (D. Minn. 1960); Bryfogle v. Acme Mkt., Inc., 176 F. Supp. 43 (E.D.
Pa. 1959); Moesser v. Crucible Steel Co., 173 F. Supp. 953 (W.D. Pa.
1959); Scot Typewriter Co. v. Underwood Corp., 170 F. Supp. 862
(S.D.N.Y. 1959); Jaconski v. McCloskey & Co., 167 F. Supp. 537 (E.D.
Pa.281958).
"The Act does not give an option to a plaintiff of treating a corpora-
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Thus far, however, the courts have not been called upon to
determine the effect of the 1958 diversity provision upon the citizenship of the true multi-state corporation-a corporation incorporated
under the laws of more than one state.29 Prior to the 1958 amendment, a majority of the cases3" held that a corporation incorporated
in the state in which suit was brought would be considered a citizen
of that state alone, regardless of the fact that the corporation may
have been incorporated elsewhere. This result was based on the
theory that when the corporation is sued in a state in which it is
incorporated, only the laws of that jurisdiction are brought into
play, and the fact that the corporation is incorporated elsewhere has
no relevance to that particular controversy. 3 Thus if an action was
brought in federal court in State A by a citizen of State B against
a corporation incorporated under the laws of both States A and B,
diversity was held to exist. 32
When this multi-state situation comes squarely before the court
under the new statute, it is believed, in light of the clear language
used in the statute,3" that the multi-state corporation will be considered a citizen of any and every state in which it is incorporated
regardless of where the action is brought; and if any one of these
citizenships coincides with that of the opposing litigant, diversity
will be found to be lacking. The clear intention of the legislature to
limit diversity, as well as the cases holding that the litigants cannot
choose whether citizenship will be by incorporation or the principal
place of business, lend support to this view.
This view has not, however, received complete acceptance. The
tion as a citizen either of the state of incorporation or of the state where

its principal place of business is located. The Act treats a corporation as a
citizen of the state where it has its principal place of business as well as the
state of incorporation. This is clearly indicated by the use of the conjunctive 'and'. The purpose of the law was to narrow jurisdiction, not to broaden
it." Canton v. Angelina Cas. Co., supra note 27, at 554.
3 Jaconski v. McCloskey & Co., 167 F. Supp. 537 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
"°E.g., Jacobson v. New York, N. H. & H. R.R., 206 F.2d 153 (1st Cir.
1953), aff'd mem., 347 U.S. 909 (1954).
31 Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. v. Eder, 174 Fed. 944, 945-46 (6th Cir. 1909).
"2Pennsylvania R.R. v. St. Louis, A. & T. H. R.R., 118 U.S. 290 (1886);
Muller v. Dows, 94 U.S. 444 (1876); Boston & M. R.R. v. Breslin, 80 F.2d
749 (1st Cir. 1935); Boston & M. R.R. v. Hurd, 108 Fed. 116 (1st Cir.
1901); Lucas v. New York C. R.R., 88 F. Supp. 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); cf.
Seavey v. Boston & M. R.R., 197 F.2d 485 (1st Cir. 1952); Delaware River
Joint Toll Bridge Comm'n v. Miller, 147 F. Supp. 270 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
" "[A] corporation shall be deemed a citizen of any State by which it has
been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business." 72 Stat. 415, 28 U.S.C., §,1332(c) (1958). (Emphasis added.)
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position has been taken84 that the law regarding the multi-state
corporation prior to the 1958 amendment was so well settled that
had Congress intended to effect a change in this law, such intention
would have been expressed either in the statute or the legislative
history of the act. Since this matter was apparently not considered
by Congress, it is argued that the established law in this field is still
in effect. Furthermore, in Jaconski v. McCloskey & Co."' the
court, in a dictum, stated that "the 1958 amendment of the Revised
Judicial Code is not understood to have direct bearing upon the bare
question of the effect of multiple incorporation in diversity litigation."3 6 When the problem of multiple incorporation is raised under
the new diversity provision, the apparent failure of Congress to
consider this situation and the pronouncement in Jaconski will undoubtedly lend strong support to the argument favoring a continuance of the old multi-state corporation case law.
While the problem of multiple incorporation is such that it will
probably be settled when a case is properly presented to the court,
the question of what is the principal place of business will be one
which the courts will continue to encounter in the future. The courts
have thus far developed no definite rules for determining the principal place of business, and the bankruptcy tests continue to be accepted. However, a new test by which the courts will determine
which of the two existing tests shall be applied to a particular situation is apparently developing. In those cases in which the home
office test was applied"7 a definite similarity can be seen in the type
of corporations involved-corporations with activities in many separate states, no one state being completely dominate over any other.
Conversely, in those cases in which the actual operations test has
been accepted,3 8 the corporations involved maintained virtually all
their tangible assets in one state and exercised control over them
" Note, 27 GEO. WAsHr. L. REV. 595 (1959). Cf. FINS, FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE 12 (1960); 3 VOLTZ, WEST'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 3142 (1960).
"167 F. Supp. 537 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
"Id. at 540 (dictum). A similar dictum is found in Fitzgerald v.
Southern Ry., 176 F. Supp. 445, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
'T E.g., Textron Electronics, Inc. v. Unholtz-Dickie Corp., 193 F. Supp.
456 (D. Conn. 1961); Riley v. Gulf, M. & 0. R.R., 173 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.
Ill. 1959); Scot Typewriter Co. v. Underwood Corp., 170 F. Supp. 862
(S.D.N.Y. 1959).
"E.g., Potocni v. Asco Mining Co., 186 F. Supp. 912 (W.D. Pa. 1960);
Webster v. Wilke, 186 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Ill. 1960); Mattson v. Cuyuna
Ore Co., 180 F. Supp. 743 (D. Minn. 1960).
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from another state. Furthermore, on numerous occasions when the
actual operations test has been applied, the courts have pointed out
that their acceptance of the actual operations test is not a rejection
of the applicability of the nerve center test under appropriate circumstances-when the activities of the corporation are scattered
among many states.3" Thus considering the manner in which the
courts have applied the bankruptcy tests so far, it is arguable that
when the corporation is concentrated in one state, the actual operations test will be applied, but in cases in which the corporate assets
are dispersed among many states, the home office or nerve center
test will be invoked.
It is still too soon, however, to ascertain whether this preliminary test will continue to be utilized to determine which of the
bankruptcy tests will be applied. It is hoped that through continual
development of this preliminary test, some degree of certainty will
be introduced into the method of determining a corporation's principal place of business.
GLEN B. HARDYMON
Federal Jurisdiction-Political Question-Non-Justiciability of State
Reapportionments
In a recent decision,' the United States Supreme Court once
again declined to consider a voting right case under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. In this case, however,
the Court invoked its jurisdiction under the fifteenth amendment.
The petitioners, all Negroes, alleged that an act of the Alabama legislature2 was a device to disenfranchise Negro citizens in the Tuskegee, Alabama municipal elections and that enforcement of this act
would deny to them their rights guaranteed under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and their right to vote
under the fifteenth amendment. 3 The district court dismissed the
action for lack of jurisdiction, stating that the question presented
was of a political nature and thus not justiciable. This was affirmed
by the court of appeals, but the Supreme Court reversed.
" E.g., Gilardi v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. 189 F. Supp. 82 (N.D. Ill.
1960) ; Webster v. Wilke, supra note 38.
1 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
'Ala. Acts 1957, No. 140.
8 The petitioners alleged that the act changed the originally square shaped
municipal boundary into a twenty-eight sided figure that was designed to
and in fact did, eliminate all but three or four of the Negro voters from the
town.
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At first glance, this case would seem to be a direct reversal of a
long standing rule, i.e., federal courts have generally refused to
consider cases involving gerrymandering. 4 Such cases have been
held non-justiciable because they involve "political questions"-questions for determination by the legislature rather than the judiciary.
The instant case is not actually a reversal, however, although it may
represent a trend in the direction of enlarging the area considered
justiciable. To perceive this clearly it is necessary to examine the
language used by the Court in rendering its decision.
The Court supported its decision by saying that since the state's
legislative power had been subjugated to the constitutional protection
of the obligation of contracts, 5 it would seem that the federal constitution would also override the state's legislative power when its
action conflicted with the provisions of the fifteenth amendment.
This case was distinguished from other "political question" cases,
however, on the grounds that the act in question was enacted clearly
against the Negroes alone, and that it was the removal of an entire
voting right.6 Its applicability as judicial precedent, therefore, seems
to be severely limited.
"South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S.
549 (1946); Radford v. Gary, 145 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Okla. 1956); Perry
v. Folsom, 144 F. Supp. 874 (N.D. Ala. 1956); Remmy v. Smith, 102 F.
Supp. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1951). But see Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355
(1932), where redistricting acts were held invalid and mandamus issued
ordering that the redistricting acts be disregarded and that the representatives be elected at large. See generally Notes, 29 N.C.L. REV. 72 (1950);
62 HARV. L. REv. 659 (1949). See also OHIO CONST. art. 11, §§ 1-11, which
provides that reapportionment shall be made every ten years by a board
composed of the Governor, Auditor of State and Secretary of State, thus
giving the board no discretion. In State ex rel. Herbert v. Bricker, 139
Ohio St. 499, 41 N.E.2d 377 (1942), mandamus was issued compelling the
board to reapportion as directed. See also Dyer v. Abe, 138 F. Supp. 220
(Hawaii 1956), which was distinguished on the grounds that it involved
the Hawaii Organic Act.
Graham v. Folsom, 200 U.S. 248 (1906); Shapleigh v. San Angelo, 167
U.S. 646 (1894); Mobile v. Watson, 116 U.S. 289 (1886); Mt. Pleasant v.
Beckwith, 100 U.S. 514 (1879); Broughton v. Pensacola, 93 U.S. 266
(1876).
' In Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939), the Court held that if a person
was denied the right to vote on the grounds of racial discrimination he had
a cause of action for damages. This action was based on the fifteenth amendment and the Civil Rights Act, Rv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1958). It must be noted that no mention was made here of an equitable
remedy as was granted in the principal case. The general rule is that equitable remedies will be granted when there is no adequate remedy available at
law.

See McCLINTOCK, EQUITY §60 (1948).

It would seem that the

dimunition of a vote would be far more susceptible to an equitable remedy
than a legal redress.
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In a concurring opinion Mr. Justice Whitaker, supported by
Justices Stewart and Douglas, stated that the decision should have
been based on the fourteenth amendment. He contended that the
Court had warped the clear meaning of the fifteenth amendment,
which was intended simply to protect minorities from being denied
the right to vote. In this case, he stated, there had been no denial
of the right to vote. What had been denied was equal protection
under the law which was protected by the fourteenth amendment.
Despite the limitation which seems to have been placed on this
case by the majority, it takes on further meaning when considering
its possible applications in future cases of unfair or unequal election
districts. To appreciate the full ramifications, it is necessary to
consider the historical background of the "political question" cases.
The first mention of the doctrine of a "political question" is
found in the very early Supreme Court case of Luther v. Borden.'
There it was held that for the Court to decide which of two governments was in force in the state of Rhode Island at a particular time,
would result in the Court's entering into a matter solely within the
domain of the legislative and executive branches of the government.
This was held notwithstanding one of the governments in question
was republican in form and the other was not, and even though the
United States Constitution provided that a republican form of
government was guaranteed to the people of the United States.8
Another strong pronouncement of this policy is found in Pacific
States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon.9 In this instance the Court refused to rule on the manner in which a tax statute, which was extremely burdensome to the petitioner, was enacted, implying that the
Court had no power to question the sovereign will of the people.' 0
The theory intrinsic in the doctrine of the non-justiciable political
questions is necessarily intertwined with the doctrine of "separation
of powers." If the courts were to assume jurisdiction over matters
'48
U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
'U.S. CONST. art. IV, §4: "The United States shall guarantee to every
state in this union a republican form of government ..
'223 U.S. 118 (1912).
"Id. at 123. The petitioner attacked the statute on the ground that it
was passed by a state government that was not republican in form, i.e., that
the actions of initiative and referendum violated the constitutional guarantee
of a republican government as set out in U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 4. The Court
held that where it is alleged that an act of a state legislature deprives a
person of property, not because it deprives him of due process of law, but
because the government is not republican in form, the question is one of a
purely political nature.
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solely within the policy-making power of the legislature, they would
be removing from the citizens their right to self-government through
elected representatives. The courts, however, do possess the power,
through judicial review, to examine legislative acts and determine
whether they violate any of the fundamental rights guaranteed to
the citizens."
Standing alone, the fact that a state allows an unfair or unequally
proportioned electoral system to exist would be beyond the bounds
of judicial review.12 In most of the states, however, there is a constitutional provision directing the periodic reapportionment of electoral districts."3 Thus, despite the requirement of periodic reapportionment of election districts, the refusal of the courts to take
judicial cognizance of the inaction of a state legislature after an
initial apportionment results in a situation in which some people have
greater voting power than others and the people possessing the lesser
voting power not being given an equal opportunity to participate in
self-government. In contrast, the courts have not failed to act in
cases where the power of a state legislature has been actively used
to produce an inequality in voting matters.' 4
Colegrove v. Green,'5 MacDougall v. Green,'" and South v.
Peters" are three cases which have been strongly relied upon by the
courts in classifying reapportionment as a non-justiciable matter.'
For this reason a brief summary of the facts and holdings in these
cases is merited.
In Colegrove, the petitioners were asking that the officers of the
state of Illinois be restrained from arranging for an election in which
members of Congress were to be chosen pursuant to provisions of an
Illinois law of 1901 governing congressional districts. They alleged
11 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 448 (1923); United States v.
Butler,
297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936).
12 Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1943); Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1
(1932); Radford v. Gary, 145 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Okla. 1956); Perry v.

Folsom, 144 F. Supp. 874 (N.D. Ala. 1951).
" E.g., N.C. CONST. art. 2, §§ 4-5; S.C. CONST. art. 3, §§ 3-4; VA.

CoNsT.

art. 4, § 43.
1" Carroll v. Becker, 285 U.S. 380 (1932); Koenig v. Flynn, 285 U.S. 375
(1932); Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
328 U.S. 549 (1946).
18335 U.S. 281 (1948).
17339 U.S. 276 (1950).
"See, e.g., South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950); Radford v. Gary,

145 F. Supp. 541, 544 (W.D. Okla. 1956); Perry v. Folsom, 144 F. Supp.
874, 876 (N.D. Ala. 1951) ; Remmey v. Smith, 102 F. Supp. 708, 710 (E.D.
Pa. 1951).
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that this was in conflict with the federal constitution and Illinois
state law. In this case only seven Justices were sitting. Three
called the matter non-justiciable because it was a political question.
Three Justices were in favor of granting the petitioners' request for
redistricting. In casting his tie-breaking vote, Mr. Justice Rutledge
implied that he sided with the petitioners on the basic issue but
thought that equitable discretion demanded leaving the problem to
the legislature.-9
In MacDougall, the petitioners were protesting a state law requiring a person who wanted to get his name on the ballot for state
office to get a minimum number of signatures on his petition for
nomination from a majority of the election districts. This was required even though eighty-seven per cent of the population was in
less than half of the districts. Without discussing jurisdiction, the
Court expressly decided the case on the merits for the defendants.2"
In the South case the complaint was directed against the Georgia
unit system which gives the residents of Fulton County an absurdly
small voting power. The Court affirmed the dismissal of the action,
stating that the "federal courts consistently refuse to exercise their
equity powers in cases posing political issues arising from a state's
geographical distribution of electoral strength among its political

subdivisions. "21
The Colegrove case should be inapposite as a precedent for
classifying reapportionment as a non-justiciable matter since only
three members of the Court felt that it presented a political question.
Mr. Justice Rutledge's tie-breaking vote was not an endorsement of
the opinion that a political question was presented; rather he voted
for dismissal on the ground of equitable discretion and implied that
a justiciable issue was presented. Moreover, the Court in MacDougall apparently ignored the jurisdictional question and rendered
a decision on the merits of the case. As to the South case, Georgia
has no provision calling for legislative action in relation to reapportionment.22 Since the Constitution gives each state the power
20328 U.S. at 564 (1946).
20335 U.S. at 285 (1948).
21339 U.S. at 277 (1950).
22
The Georgia unit system provides that after each census the original
apportionment shall be automatically changed to give the six counties having
the largest population three representatives each; the twenty-six counties
having the next largest population two representatives each; and the rest
of the counties one representative each. The result of this system is that
a county with 5,000 people has one representative and a county with 100,000
people has only three representatives.
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to desigfi its electoral system, there is no way to compare the Georgia
situation with -that which. exists in the majority of states. It must
be remembered-that the courts have no power to make a law for a
state in this area, but merely to see that the action of the law in
practice does not deny individuals constitutionally guaranteed
rights.23
It is submitted that the dissents of Justices Black in the Colegrove case, Douglas in the South case and Whitaker in the principal
case are the better view. Mr. Justice Black stated that the condition
which gave rise to the Colegrove case, i.e., the refusal of the legislature to redistrict in the face of a mandate to do so, promoted a
wholly indefensible discrimination against the petitioners in that case
and all other voters in densely populated areas of that state.24 Mr.
Justice Douglas stated that the condition giving rise to the South
case was a clear reduction of the right of a selective group of citizens
to vote equally with the remainder of the electorate.2 It is further
submitted that the following line of cases supports the view of the
dissenters.
In Strauder v. West Virginia" the question presented was
whether Negroes could be systematically excluded from juries in
the courts of that state. The Supreme Court held that a state was
not required to give any rights to its citizens under the Constitution
but that once a right was given, all citizens were to be given that
right equally unless it could be removed from individuals for adequate reasons. It would seem that the voting power which is unconditionally guaranteed should be protected in the same manner.
In Nixon v. Herndon2 7 the right to vote in a primary was held to
come under protection of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. In United States v. Saylor active dilution of a
citizen's vote was held to be a federal crime. In other words, one
cannot stand by a ballot box and put in a vote for X every time
somebody votes for Y. In an area where the voting districts are
unfairly drawn, the same end is reached by giving a district of
100,000 the same number of electoral votes as a district of 10,000.
" See generally Comment, Reapportionment: Is it Really A Political
Question?, 17 LA. L. REV. 593 (1956).
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 569 (1946) (dissent).
" South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 278 (1950) (dissent).
28 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
27273 U.S. 536 (1927).
28322 U.S. 385 (1944).
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Mr. Justice Frankfurter has condemned "sophisticated as well as
simple-minded modes of discrimination." 29
In United States v. Mosely8 ° and United States v. Classic8 ' it
was held that the right to vote included the right to have the ballot
counted. It would seem to be a logical extension of this to say that
that protection should also cover the right to have one vote counted
as much as the next. The Court has said that the fourteenth amendment "merely requires that all persons subjected to [state] legislation . ..be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions,

both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed"82 and
that the fourteenth amendment "was designed to prevent any person
or class of persons from being singled out as a special subject for
discriminating and hostile legislation."8 "
Thus it would seem obvious that the passage of new legislation
or continued enforcement of an old law effect the same result on a
group of people within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment.
It seems contradictory to say that the remedy for denial of equality
in voting power is the assertion of a diluted voting power in the next
election. It may be admitted that mere failure to reapportion election
districts is non-justiciable. Nevertheless the enforcement of an
outdated, unfair act should be subject to review for it clearly deprives the person affected of equal protection under the law. A
thorough, straightforward look at the situation was presented by
Judge McLaughlin:
The time has come, and the Supreme Court has marked
the way, when serious consideration should be given to a
reversal of traditional reluctance of judicial intervention in
legislative reapportionment. The whole thrust of today's
legal climate is to end unconstitutional discrimination. It is
ludicrous to preclude judicial relief when a mainspring of
representative government is impaired. Legislators have no
immunity from the Constitution. The legislatures of our
land should be made as responsive to the Constitution of
the United States as are the citizens who elect the legis34

lators.

8'Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 299, 302 (1939).
°238 U.S. 383 (1915).
81313 U.S. 299 (1941).
82Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 71 (1886).
"Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 188 (1888).
,Dyer v. Abe, 138 F. Supp. 220, 236 (Hawaii 1956).
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The ills effectuated by the refusal of state legislatures to apportion when justice demands it are very similar to the ills which have
been repeatedly redressed by the courts in the individual rights
cases. It is possible that the Court has at last started to consider
gerrymander cases in the light of the individual right decisions.
It is submitted that the Gomillion case may well mean that the
Court has decided that justice demands the granting of equitable
remedies in these instances. 35
JOSEPH S. FRIEDBERG

Insurance-Burden of Proof in Insurance Exception ClausesPleading
In Muncie v. Travelers Ins. Co.,1 the plaintiff was injured while
riding in the automobile of the insured. Eight months after the
accident, the insured gave notice to the insurance company. The
insurer denied liability under the policy due to the insured's failure
to comply with a policy requirement for notification of loss within
a reasonable time. The policy designated compliance with this requirement as a condition precedent to recovery. The plaintiff sued
the insured and received a default judgment. The insurer knew
of this suit but was not a party thereto. In the suit by the plaintiff
against the insurer, the trial court instructed the jury that the
burden of proof was on the insurer to show that notice had not been
given within a reasonable time. This instruction was held error
on appeal, the court holding that the notice requirement was a condition precedent to recovery by the insured, thereby placing the
burden of proof of compliance with this requirement on the plaintiff.2
In reaching this result, the court distinguished the present case
from MacClure v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co.,. which indicated that
noncompliance with a cooperation requirement in an insurance
"' If the result of a judicial order enjoining the further operation of an
archaic electoral district would be slight disorganization by the use of an
"at large" electoral system in the next election, it must be answered that
necessity will soon generate a newer, fairer and more workable system.
t253 N.C. 74, 116 S.E.2d 474 (1960).
In Muncie the plaintiff was the insured's judgment creditor. The court
stated that as such he could have no greater right to recover from the insurer
than the insured himself would have. Id. at 81, 116 S.E.2d at 479.
8229 N.C. 305, 49 S.E.2d 742 (1948).
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policy was a condition subsequent to recovery and therefore an
affirmative defense, stating that this portion of the opinion was
merely dictum. Thus, the court avoided any commitment that the
condition in MacClure was not actually a condition subsequent'
and upheld a line of earlier cases, culminating in Peeler v. United
States Cas. Co.,5 which placed the burden of proving notice requirements on the insured as conditions precedent to recovery.
These cases raise the recurring problem of who has the burden
of proof as to particular conditions, exclusions and exceptions within
insurance contracts. The courts have failed to determine a uniform
rule for this allocation. That this should be of more than passing
interest to the parties in insurance cases can be seen in those cases
where this allocation itself determined the outcome.6
Traditionally the burden of proof has been allocated in four
ways :' (1) the burden is on the party who seeks an affirmative
answer to the issue in question;' (2) the burden is on the party to
whose case the fact is essential;9 (3) the burden is on the party
' In MacClure the insurer denied liability because of an alleged breach by
the insured of a cooperation requirement within the policy. The court allowed recovery, stating that noncompliance with the cooperation requirement by the insured was an affirmative defense to liability under the policy.
The clause was, the court stated, a condition subsequent. This was true even
though the policy designated the clause as a condition precedent, since such
matters related to the conduct of the insured after the loss which matured
the policy. Id. at 310, 49 S.E.2d at 747.
In a concurring opinion to Muncie, Mr. justice Parker refused to accept
the dismissal of MacClure by merely declaring it to be dictum. He felt that
the MacClure statement that noncompliance with the policy requirement was
an affirmative defense was "erroneous and should be disapproved or overruled
by the court," not merely disregarded as dictum. Muncie v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 253 N.C. 74, 85-86, 116 S.E.2d 474, 482 (1960). His use of the word
"overruled" seems to indicate that the MacClure statement might be a holding, not merely dictum.
197 N.C. 286, 148 S.E. 261 (1929).
'See, e.g., Colovos' Adm'r v. Gouvas, 269 Ky. 752, 108 S.W.2d 820
(1937), where the life insurance policy provided that payment of the pro:eeds be made to the insured's wife should she survive the insured. If the
wife predeceased the insured, the proceeds were to be paid to the insured's
estate. The insured and his wife died simultaneously in a common disaster.
field: the personal representative of the wife could not recover on the policy
since he could not prove the condition precedent, namely, that the insured
predeceased his wife.
' STANSBURY, THE NoRTH CAROLINA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 208 (1946);
9 WIGAORE, EVIDENCE § 2486 (3d ed. 1940).
8
Jones v. Waldroup, 217 N.C. 178, 7 S.E.2d 366 (1940); Wilson v.

Inter-Ocean Cas. Co., 210 N.C. 585, 188 S.E. 102 (1936); Stein v. Levins,
205 N.C. 302, 171 S.E. 96 (1933).
' Hauser v. Western Union Tel. Co., 150 N.C. 557, 64 S.E. 503 (1909).
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having sole knowledge of the fact ;1" and (4) the burden is on the
party who has the burden of pleading the fact.11
In contract cases generally allocation of the burden of proof for
compliance with or occurrence of conditions stated in the contract
has long been a problem."2 Allocation usually has been made on a
basis of whether the condition involved is a condition precedent or
subsequent. A condition precedent is involved "where the contract
provides for performance of some act or the happening of some
event, and the obligations of such contract are made to depend on
such performance or happening."' 3 The condition subsequent is
that clause which provides "that the policy shall become void .. .
upon the happening of some event, or the doing, or omission to do,
some act.... 4 Following these definitions, the burden of proving
a condition precedent has been placed on the plaintiff and a condition subsequent on the defendant.' 5
Due to the complexity of insurance policies, a particular amount
of confusion has arisen in allocating the burden of proof in cases
involving them. If the traditional contract condition precedent-condition subsequent test is used, the problem arises in categorizing the
various "conditions," "exclusions" and "exceptions" of the typical
policy. First it must be determined if they are conditions at all. 1
If so, they must be categorized as conditions precedent or subse10

Skyland Hosiery Co. v. American Ry. Exp. Co., 184 N.C. 478, 114

S.E. 823 (1922); Ange v. Woodmen of the World, 173 N.C. 33, 91 S.E.
586 (1917).
" Hood v. Cobb, 207 N.C. 128, 176 S.E. 288 (1934); Cook v. Guirkin
& Co., 119 N.C. 13, 25 S.E. 715 (1896).

12 Harnett & Thornton, The Insurance Condition Subsequent: A Needle
in a Semantic Haystack, 17 FORDHAM L. REv. 220 (1948).

1 3Jenkins

v. Myers, 209 N.C. 312, 318, 183 S.E. 529, 532 (1936).

WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 667A, at 1919 (rev. ed. 1936).

A similar
definition is given in the Restatement of Contracts: "[A] condition is ...
13

either a fact ...

which, unless excused ... (a) must exist or occur before a

duty of immediate performance of a promise arises, in which case the condition is a 'condition precedent,' or (b) will extinguish a duty to make compensation for breach of contract after the breach has occurred, in which case the
condition is a 'condition subsequent,' or a term in a promise providing that
a fact shall have such an effect." RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 250 (1932).
"Barron v. Cain, 216 N.C. 282, 4 S.E.2d 618 (1939); Hyder v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 183 S.C. 98, 190 S.E. 239 (1937).
" That a single policy can contain a great number of exceptions can
be seen in the policy involved in Travelers Ins. Co. v. McConkey, 127 U.S.
661, 662 (1888). See Seawell, J., in MacClure v. Accident & Cas. Ins.
Co., 229 N.C. 305, 311, 49 S.E.2d 742, 747 (1948), quoting 3 WILLISTON,
op. cit. supra note 14, in context which raises this question. See generally
Note, Burden of Proof of Excepted Causes in Insurance Policies, 46 COLUM.
L.REv. 802 (1946).
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quent. Applying the contract test to insurance policies, it could
be said that there is only one true condition subsequent, this being
the imposition of a time limit within which the suit must be brought.
All other conditions would then be conditions precedent which must
1e' proved by the plaintiff. 7 The problem would be simplified if
the court followed such a rule strictly. The confusion has arisen,
however, where the courts have attempted to lighten the burden of
the plaintiff by designating certain conditions as affirmative defenses. AK expanded conception of the condition subsequent is one
of the vehicles' by which this is accomplished.
Some degree of certainty is needed. When applied to insurance
"conditions," "exclusions" and "exceptions," the failure of the
substantive contract test to supply any workable standard becomes
apparent. The problem involved in the Muncie and MacClure cases
clearly demonstrate this. The court in these two cases was dealing
with a similar type of policy provision; yet in one case the court
held it to be a condition subsequent while in the other the court saw
it as a condition precedent. The impossibility of using this as a
continuing basis for the allocation of the burden of proof is indicated
by an analysis of how the court in these two cases took two different
views of the same determining' factor. In MacClure the court
was relating performance of condition to the time of loss, to which
it was subsequent;"8 while in Muncie the court was relating performance of condition, to the time of bringing the suit, to which
it was precedent. For any degree of unif6rmiiity, the allocatioi of
the burden of proof must contemplate an agreed single reference
point.' 9 Obviously, the terms "precedent" and "subsequent" are
utterly devoid of meaning unless so related. Adding to the con'7 Northwest Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 56 Okla. 188, 155 Pac. 524
(1916); Harnett & Thornton, supra note 12, at 232.
18 "It is to be observed that in substance the plea relates to conduct of
the insured after the liability on the policy has matured by reason of the
accident." MacClure, v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co., 229 N.C. 305, 311, 49
S.E.2d 742, 747 (1948).
"The necessity of the single reference point can be shown in another
context by considering the requirement for procurement of an architect's
certificate for full payment on a building contract. Although this is generaly considered to be a condition precedent, this condition can- be seen as
a condition subsequent merely by changing the reference point. Procurement of this certificate is precedent to duty of payment for full performance,
or the right to bring an action for its recovery if payment is refused. Yet,
procurement of the certificate is subsequent to certain facts, such as "offer,"
"acceptance" and "consideration." Harnett & Thornton, supra note 12, at
324. See also HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 316 (1881): "In one sense, all
conditions are subsequent; in another, all are precedent."
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fusion arising from any use of the substantive standard is the fact
that many exclusions and exceptions in insurance policies cannot
be based on any chronological conception-for example, a flat exclusion such as suicide.2 0

For the present, such certainty as we have comes from specific
decisions which have for one reason or another allocated the burden
of proof in respect to specific provisions. For example, on current
case authority the insured has the burden of showing that his injury was covered by the policy,21 that there was a valid policy in
effect at the time of loss,2" that the insurer has waived or is estopped
to deny recovery due to a breach by the insured,2 3 and general compliance with the requirements set out in the policy, such as "the
giving of notice and proof of death (or other event). '"24 On the
other hand, the court has placed the burden of proof upon the insurer in respect to suicide exclusion clauses, 25 property damage exceptions, 6 and violent death exceptions.2 Yet, as Muncie reveals,
even this apparent certainty based upon specific authority may be
illusory.
The problem is of more than mere academic interest. The difficulty is that both litigants may be forced at different stages of the
litigation to make definitional decisions which can control the outcome of the case. Such decisions, however, are impossible to make
on a rational basis, as they involve deciding which provisions within
a policy are "conditions precedent" and which are "conditions sub0

Within this area come the numerous insurance "warranties." They
are limitations upon the coverage of the policy, not merely a limitation upon
the recovery of the insured per se. As such, they are not easily categorized
into any position with relation to the formation of the contract, the loss or
the recovery.
Jones v. Life & Cas. Co., 199 N.C. 772, 155 S.E. 870 (1930).
22 Chavis v. Home Sec. Life Ins. Co., 251 N.C. 849, 112 S.E.2d 574
(1960); Wells v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 211 N.C. 427, 190 S.E.
744 (1937); Collins v. United States Cas. Co., 172 N.C. 543, 90 S.E. 585
(1916); Page v. Life Ins. Co., 131 N.C. 115, 42 S.E. 543 (1902).
28 Swartzberg v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 252 N.C. 150, 113 S.E.2d 270
(1960) ; Smith v. Aetna Ins. Co., 197 N.C. 621, 150 S.E. 114 (1929).
4
Fallins v. Durham Life Ins. Co., 247 N.C. 72, 74, 100 S.E.2d 214, 216

(1957).
2 Hedgecock v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins.
Co., 212 N.C. 638, 194 S.E.

86 (1937); Wharton v. New York Life Ins. Co., 178 N.C. 135, 100 S.E.
266 (1919).
26 Polansky v. Millers' Mut. Fire. Ins. Ass'n, 238 N.C. 427, 78 S.E.2d

213 (1953); Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 231 N.C.
510,2 57 S.E.2d 809 (1950).
"Warren v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 215 N.C. 402, 2 S.E.2d 17 (1939).
generally 9 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 7, at § 2510.

See
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sequent." The confusion has arisen due to a combination of several factors: our statutory provisions in regard to the pleading and
proof of conditions precedent2 s and affirmative defenses;29 our borrowing for definitional purposes the substantive contract distinction
between conditions precedent and subsequent; and our equating of
conditions subsequent into affirmative defenses. These factors in
combination may confront the insured with the necessity of making
this perilous definitional decision at the proof stage, while the insurer may encounter it at both the pleading and the proof stages.30
To remove the uncertainty which is apparently now built into
our practice by the combination of factors here developed, legislation
might be appropriate."' Such legislation has been adopted in other
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-155 (1953).
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-135 (1953).
" In a suit on an insurance policy, the insured carries the burden of
pleading conditions precedent by pleading generally that he complied with all

conditions precedent. If this allegation is controverted, the insured must

then establish, on trial, the facts showing performance. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1-155 (1953). At this stage the insured has not been called upon to make
any determination as to what precisely are conditions precedent, but only to
plead general compliance. The insurer at this point in the trial is confronted
with this situation: he may make a general denial of the insured's general
allegation of compliance with the conditions precedent, which poses no
definitional problem to him. But, if he desires to raise in defense what the
court determines to be a condition subsequent, and so, an affirmative defense,
he must specifically plead it. This poses a definitional problem for him and
he must at his peril make it correctly. Assuming that the insurer has made
a general denial of the insured's allegations of performance of all conditions
precedent, the insured is now in turn forced into a definitional decision of
what are the conditions precedent within the policy. To recover he must
carry the burden of proof on all conditions precedent which have been controverted by the insurer. This has the effect of forcing the insured to proceed blindly and prove facts showing performance of all conditions which
could possibly be denominated as precedent. It seems hardly an equitable
result since the insurer would be in a much better position than the insured
to know which conditions have or have not been performed.
" Perhaps North Carolina has inadvertently taken a step in this direction with the passage of the Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 20-279.1 (Supp. 1959). Those applicable provisions of this
act which deal with the subject at hand, however, are far too limited to
the area of automobile accident policies to cover the allocation of the burden
with respect to other types of insurance policies. It must also be noted that
this act was passed to fulfill another purpose, not to solve the allocation of
the burden of proof with respect to insurance contract conditions.
A recent case, Swain v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 253 N.C. 120, 116
S.E.2d 482 (1960), shows the effect of this statute on the problem before us.
In Swain a question similar to that in Muncie was before the court. The
court distinguished it from Muncie by the application of this statute, reaching
a contrary result. The court said in Swain that under this new statute the
failure of the insured to comply with a policy requirement for notice did not
defeat the right of the judgment creditor to recover. The court stated that
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jurisdictions.3 2 The aim of such legislation should be two-fold.
First, it should relieve the parties from having to make such a
definitional decision. Second, it should cast the burden of pleading
and proof in regard to these insurance conditions in accordance
with the most appropriate purposes of pleading and proof. A more
equitable rule could be devised using such factors as the availability
of evidence to one side or another and the relative positions of the
parties as the criteria for determining this allocation of the burdens
of pleading and proof. Obviously, the substantive results of insurance litigation will be affected by the way the burden is cast,
whatever success such rule would have in removing the impossible
definitional problem here discussed."
It is submitted that legislation of the following type would be
appropriate. Place the burden upon the insurer of pleading specifically any grounds for which he denies liability, and upon the
insured the burden of proving that liability should not be barred by
any such facts pleaded by the insurer.34 The insured would allege
in an accident arising after the effective date of the statute and where the
judgment against the insured is equal to or less than the maximum coverage
under the statute, non-compliance by the insured with a notice provision will
not defeat the judgment creditor's right to recover. However, as to accidents arising prior to this effective date of the statute (as the principal
case) and as to any amount in excess of the statutory coverage, such violations2 by the insured are still valid defenses to the insurer.
" E.g., N.Y. INs. LAW § 167.5 (1945); Txx. Rav. STAT. §§ 3-48, -62
(1951).
" New York allows allegations by the insured of all conditions precedent
in general terms and requires the insurer to specifically counter them. The insured is deemed to have proved all conditions not so traversed by the insurer,
but must carry the burden of proof of a condition properly denied. N.Y.
INs. LAW § 167.5 (1945). Yet, this rule gives no definite answer as to what
constitutes a condition subsequent which presumably the insurer must specifically plead as an affirmative defense. The Texas rule solves this by
placing the burden on the insured to plead and prove that the loss is not within an excepted area of the policy. TEx. REV. STAT. §§ 3-48, -62 (1951).
This would seem to place the burden of proof on the insured for all excepted
clauses within the policy, a burden which seems unduly heavy. For typical
litigation on the effect of this rule, see Imperial Life Ins. Co. v. Thornton,
138 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); Coyle v. Palatine Ins. Co., 222
S.W. 973 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1920); see also Note, 6 BAYLER L. REV. 238

(1954).

"' This would have the effect of dividing the burden of pleading and proof
as is now done by the statute of limitations. Muncie dealt with the burden
of proof, as distinguished from the burden of pleading. The party who has
the burden of proof has traditionally under our procedure also been given the
burden of pleading. The statute of limitations is one of the few exceptions
where the burdens are split between the two parties. The defendant has
the burden of pleading the statute, but once properly pleaded the plaintiff
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the ultimate facts of execution of the policy, loss within its coverage while the policy was in force, and general performance of all
conditions. This, if uncontested, would be sufficient to entitle insured to payment under the policy and the right to maintain the
action. The insurer, should he wish to contest liability, would then
have the burden of pleading specifically any matter by reason of
which nonliability is asserted. This would be true whether the
matter relates to provisions denominated or interpreted as "conditions," "exclusions" or "exceptions" of whatever kind. Once
specifically raised by the insurer, the insured would have the burden
of proving facts which show that his recovery should not be barred
by the allegations of the insurer, i.e., facts showing specific compliance with the conditions raised by the insurer."s
CARL

A.

BARRINGTON, JR.

Master and Servant-Unfair Use of Customer Lists and Knowledge
In Henley PaperCo. v. McAllister,1 the plaintiff company sought
to enjoin a former salesman from working for a competitor, relying
upon an employment contract which contained a covenant not to
compete. The plaintiff was engaged in a highly competitive business
selling paper products and had hired the defendant as a salesman.
While working for the plaintiff, the defendant had compiled at his
own expense a record of sales and subsequently terminated his
service with the plaintiff to work for a competitor, using the record
of sales to solicit business for his new employer. The North Carolina
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision that the provisions
of the covenant not to compete were unreasonable as to time and
geography and that the covenant lacked consideration. The view
has the burden of proof to deny it. Lee v. Chamblee, 223 N.C. 146, 25
S.E.2d 433 (1943); see also 1 McINToSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 372 (2d ed. 1956).
" Under the rule submitted, which is quite similar to the New York
rule, there would be no problem with the definitional decision, as there would
be no categorizing of conditions as precedent or subsequent. Nor would the
insured, when his allegation of performance of all conditions precedent is met
by a general denial, be forced (as he presently is) to carry the burden of

proof blindly as to which conditions he must prove to satisfy the burden

of proof. The insurer is in a better position to know the policy and exactly

which facts or occurrences act as a bar to his liability. The more equitable

rule, therefore, would be to place the burden of pleading these facts or occurrences upon the insurer, and by so doing we enable the insured to know exactly
what he must prove to secure recovery.
1253 N.C. 529, 117 S.E.2d 431 (1960).
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taken in this case seems to be consistent with prior North Carolina
decisions' on restrictive covenants which were deemed to be unreasonable.
Although the point was not expressly raised in the principal case,
the question arises whether a restraining order to prevent the defendant from soliciting the plaintiff's customers while working for
a competitor would have been proper in the absence of a covenant
not to compete.8 This question does not appear to have been decided in North Carolina, but other jurisdictions have protected the
4
former employer in this situation.
Jurisdictions which have protected the former employer from
competitive solicitation by a former employee usually require a threefold showing by the plaintiff.5 First, he must show that knowledge
or a list of the names, addresses and requirements of customers
constitute a trade secret. Second, that the defendant, while in a
2 Noe

v. McDevitt, 228 N.C. 242, 45 S.E.2d 121 (1947); Kadis v. Britt,

224 N.C. 154, 29 S.E.2d 543 (1943). See generally Note, Covenants Not To
Compete, 38 N.C.L. REV. 395 (1960).
'The scope of this note is confined solely to the fact situation where an
employee, while working for an employer, compiles a record of sales and
subsequently terminates his service with the employer to work for a competitor or to start his own business, using the record of sales to solicit business and to compete with the former employer. The question is not whether
the employer can prevent the employee from competing at all, but rather
whether the employer can prevent the employee from engaging in certain
competitive practices such as soliciting business from customers whose names
or addresses he acquired while employed by the former employer.
'See, e.g., George v. Burdusis, 21 Cal. 2d 153, 130 P.2d 399 (1942);
Town & Country House & Home Serv., Inc. v. Newbery, 3 N.Y. 2d 554, 147
N.E.2d 724 (1958). In these cases, two points of view have to be considered.
"The names of customers of a business concern, whose trade and patronage
have been secured by years of business effort and advertising, and the expenditure of time and money, constituting a part of the good will of a business which enterprise and foresight have built up, should be . . . entitled

to the same protection as the secret of compounding some article of manufacture and commerce. Colonial Laundries, Inc. v. Henry, 48 R.I. 332, 334,
138 At. 47, 49 (1927); and equity will, to the greatest extent, protect the
property rights of employers in their trade secrets and otherwise. Alex
Foods, Inc. v. Metcalfe, 137 Cal. App. 2d 415, 290 P.2d 646 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1955). But the rights and interests of the employee also have to be
considered. Sound public policy encourages employees to seek better jobs
from other employers and even to go into business for themselves. Haut v.
Rossbach, 128 N.J. Eq. 77, 15 A.2d 227 (Ct. Ch. 1940), aff'd, 128 N.J.
Eq. 478, 17 A.2d 165 (Ct. Err. & App. 1941). The employee should not be
deprived of the right to pursue a lawful and gainful occupation in a field for
which he is equipped. Levine v. E. A. Johnson & Co., 107 Cal. App. 2d 322,
237 P.2d 309 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951).
'George v. Burdusis, 21 Cal. 2d 153, 160, 130 P.2d 399, 403 (1942);
J. L. Cooper & Co. v. Anchor Sec. Co., 9 Wash. 2d 45, 64, 113 P.2d 845,

854 (1941).
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position of trust and confidence with his employer, acquired such
knowledge or list. And third, that in violation of this trust and
confidence, the defendant is using this knowledge or list to the
injury and detriment of the former employer.
It is not a simple matter to determine what customer lists constitute trade secrets. Where the very continuance of a business depends upon keeping secret the names of customers,' and such secret
knowledge and lists are an important asset to the business,' then
such lists are species of property 8 and are entitled to protection.
Knowledge of customers' addresses, buying habits, requirements and
preferences has been held to be confidential 9 and a trade secret. 10
But where the names of customers are readily ascertainable and are
of a class known to the public in general, such as wholesale buyers
who are few in number 1 or persons listed in public directories or
trade publications,'" knowledge or a list of these customers is not a
trade secret.' 3 A list of customers of a simple artless business is
not a trade secret,' 4 especially where the business relationship with
'George v. Burdusis, 21 Cal. 2d 153; 130 P.2d 399 (1942).
Brenner v. Stavinsky, 184 Okla. 509, 511, 88 P.2d 613, 615 (1939).
8Ibid.
Waliich v. Koren, 80 Cal. App. 2d 223, 181 P.2d 681 (Dist. Ct. App.

9

1947), holding that where the business is one of repeated purchases in preference to the products of competitors, such knowledge of these customers is
"good will."
1" George v. Burdusis, 21 Cal. 2d 153, 160, 130 P.2d 399, 403 (1942).
A

list of customers is a trade secret if the owner has confidential knowledge
concerning
the value of such customers; Wallich v. Koren, supra note 9.
"1Alex Foods, Inc. v. Metcalfe, 137 Cal. App. 2d 415, 290 P.2d 646 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1955).
10 J. C. Millett Co. v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 123 F. Supp.
484, 496 (N.D. Cal. 1954) ; Gloria Ice Cream & Milk Co. v. Cowan, 2 Cal.
2d 460, 464, 41 P.2d 340, 342 (1935).
1" George v. Burdusis, 21 Cal. 2d 153, 159, 130 P.2d 399, 403 (1942).
" Abalene Exterminating Co. v. Elges, 137 N.J. Eq. 1, 3, 43 A.2d 165,
166 (Ct. Ch. 1945). Customers on a fuel oil delivery route are not trade
secrets. Vesuvius Fuel Oil Corp. v. Pirraglia, 128 N.Y.S.2d 2 (Sup. Ct.
1950) ; accord, as to laundry patrons. Fulton Grand Laundry Co. v. Johnson,
140 Md. 359, 117 At. 753 (1922). However, the fact that patrons are listed
in the telephone directory but are otherwise unknown to the public generally
as business value does not prevent a customer list from being valuable.
George v. Burdusis, supra note 13. Confidential records of policy holders'
names, addresses and insurance data are trade secrets. Hoslinger, Theis &
Co. v. Holsinger, 329 Ill. App. 460, 471, 69 N.E.2d 360, 365 (1946) ; accord,
J. L. Cooper & Co. v. Anchor Sec. Co., 9 Wash. 2d 45, 113 P.2d 845 (1941).
Likewise, customer lists of persons without places of business which would
have been accessible to competitors only by investigation are trade secrets.
Nathan Outfitters, Inc. v. Pravder, 191 Misc. 726, 77 N.Y.S.2d 655 (Sup.
Ct. 1948). See for a contrary result concerning the names of general fire
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these customers is usually short in duration and often not renewed.'
The second showing that the plaintiff must make in order to
obtain relief is that the employee held a position of trust and confidence when he obtained the information to be protected."6 The
plaintiff must also show that the employee has violated this trust
and confidence.'
The former employee may seek the trade and
business of his old employer's customers by fair methods including
advertising,s but he may not canvass old customers whose identities
he learned in confidence and thereby destroy the good will of his
former employer.'" A salesman is privileged to advise the trade
that he has changed employment to the house of a rival employer 2"
or that he has established his own business, 2' as a notice of termination of employment is not considered solicitation.22 The former employee may solicit old customers to buy a new line of products which
3
are not handled by his old employer.1
The courts are almost unanimous in ruling, however, that a
former employee cannot use written lists,24 business records," or
insurance policy holders. Port Inv. Co. v. Oregon Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 163
Ore. 1, 94 P.2d 734 (1939).

"Aetna Bldg. Maintenance Co. v. West, 39 Cal. 2d 198, 205, 246 P.2d
11, 16 (1952).
" Though few cases have turned on or discussed this point at length,

the relationship is always evident. The American Law Institute takes
particular cognizance of this point, however: "The agent . . . has a duty
to the principal ... not to use or disclose ... trade secrets, written lists of
names, or other similar confidential matter given to him for the principal's

use or acquired by the agent in violation of duty...."
(Second), AGENCY § 396(b) (1958).

RESTATEMENT

'Alex Foods, Inc. v. Metcalfe, 137 Cal. App. 2d 415, 290 P.2d 646
(Dist. Ct. App. 1955). The former employee's duty to the principal continues even after termination of employment. J. L. Cooper & Co. v. Anchor
Sec. Co., 9 Wash. 2d 45, 53, 113 P.2d 845, 854 (1941).
" J. L. Cooper & Co. v. Anchor Sec. Co., supra note 17.
11Ibid.
Wallich v. Koren, 80 Cal. App. 2d 223, 181 P.2d 682 (Dist. Ct. App.
1947).
" Aetna Bldg. Maintenance Co. v. West, 39 Cal. 2d 198, 203, 246 P.2d
11, 14 (1952).
" Alex Foods, Inc. v. Metcalfe, 137 Cal. App. 2d 415, 290 P.2d 646 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1955).
" Ibid. Accord, where there is no evidence that the employee had a
plan or scheme to injure the former employer. Ice Delivery Co. v. Davis,
137 Wash. 649, 243 Pac. 842 (1926).
24 Brenner v. Stavinsky 184 Okla. 509, 510, 88 P.2d 613, 615 (1939).
"It is well settled in California that after an employee who worked on a
retail delivery route has left the service of his employer, his use of customer
lists to solicit for another person is an unwarranted disclosure of trade
secrets." George v. Burdusis, 21 Cal. 2d 153, 159, 130 P.2d 399, 402 (1942).
A list of milk customers is confidential information and its use will be re20
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route books2" to competitively solicit old customers where their requirements and identities are trade secrets and the employee came
by them in a position of trust. One reason that the courts will
readily restrain the use of written lists is based upon the theory that
the employer has a property right in written records" and if an
employee retains a list, he is carrying away something more than
mere experience gained in the business.2
Once the identity of the customers and their requirements are
classified as confidential and the employee has learned of them in
confidential service, many courts say that it makes no difference
that the employee retains and uses the list of customers on paper or
in his head.29 Most courts recognize the property rights in written
records, sometimes even where the names on them are not confidential, and their language in prohibiting the use of written lists
appears to be more resolute and certain when they can rely on the
property theory.3 0 However, when courts have restrained a former
strained. Soeder v. Soeder, 82 Ohio App. 71, 77 N.E.2d 474 (1947). It
is not less confidential because a spy could discover the same. Colonial
Laundries, Inc. v. Henry, 48 R.I. 332, 337, 138 Atl. 47, 49 (1927). The
prohibition against using written records also extends to those lists and
records which the employee surreptitiously copies or obtains during his
employment and subsequently uses. Brenner v. Stavinsky, supra.545 (1938).
" Jewel Tea Co. v. Grissom, 66 S.D. 146, 148, 279 N.W. 544,
28Santa Monica Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Rossier, 42 Cal. App. 2d 467,
109 P.2d 382 (Dist. Ct. App. 1941).
" Alex Foods, Inc. v. Metcalfe, 137 Cal. App. 2d 415, 290 P.2d 646 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1955).
28 Di Angeles v. Scauzillo, 287 Mass. 291, 298, 191 N.E. 426, 429 (1934).
Solicitation will be restrained even where the lists are not confidential but
the employee carries out a preconceived plan to injure the plaintiff's business
by unfair competition. Gloria Ice Cream & Milk Co. v. Cowan, 2 Cal. 2d
460, 464, 41 P.2d 340, 342 (1935). Even where a salesman's contract provides for liquidated damages for failure to return secret lists, he is not

authorized to turn over these lists to a rival of his employer. Messenger
Pub. Co. v. Mokstad, 257 Ill. App. 161 (1930). The business competitor
who hires the employee will also be restrained from accepting business from
customers unfairly solicited by the former employee with the use of written
lists. George Burdusis, 21 Cal. 2d 153, 163, 130 P.2d 399, 404 (1942),
adding that the "employer should also be prohibited from obtaining the
benefit
of such unfair practices to make the remedy effective and complete."
"9Alex Foods, Inc. v. Metcalfe, 137 Cal. App. 2d 415, 290 P.2d 646
(Dist. Ct. App. 1955); J. L. Cooper & Co. v. Anchor Sec. Co., 9 Wash. 2d
45, 67, 113 P.2d 845, 855 (1941). There were no written lists in Colonial
Laundries, Inc. v. Henry, 48 R.I. 332, 338, 138 AtI. 47, 49 (1927), but the
court stated that it could not see why the employer was entitled to less pro-

tection when the names on a list were carried off in the defendant's memory.
Contra, American Binder Co. v. Regal & Wade Mfg. Co., 278 App. Div.
431, 106 N.Y.S.2d 543 (1951).
"0See discussion in notes 24 and 28 supra.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

employee from calling upon customers whom he remembers, the
courts tend to strictly construe the circumstances."'
As previously pointed out, North Carolina has never decided
whether equity will restrain a former employee from unfairly
soliciting old customers in the absence of a covenant not to compete.
3 2
But it should be noted that in Kadis v. Britt,
the court cited with
approval a portion of the Restatement of Agency as follows:
The agent may use general information concerning the
business of the principal and the names retained in his memory, if not acquired in violation of his duty as agent ...
Thus while the agent cannot properly use written memoranda
concerning customers entrusted to him, or made by him for
use in connection with the principal's business, or copies
thereof . .. he is privileged to use in competition with the

principal the names retained in his memory as a result with
the principal and methods of doing business ... 2a
North Carolina has approved covenants not to compete. Therefore, if the question is properly presented, it is submitted that
the North Carolina court should enjoin unfair competitive solicitation by a former employee using written records in the absence of
any covenant not to compete.3 4 What limitation the court would
"As outlined in Alex Foods, Inc. v. Metcalfe, 137 Cal. App. 2d 415, 290
P.2d 646 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955), the plaintiff has to show that the employee acquired the secret knowledge of the customers during his employment, that this knowledge was not generally known to competitors, that these
customers were solicited with intent to injure the plaintiff's business and
that these customers whose trade was particularly profitable would usually
patronize only one business or concern and would continue to do so unless
unfairly hindered.
82224 N.C. 154, 162, 29 S.E.2d 543, 548 (1944).
RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 396 (1933).
The court in Kadis v. Britt,
supra note 32, at 162, 29 S.E.2d at 548, also cited with approval a statement
from Peerless Pattern Co. v. Pictorial Review Co., 147 App. Div. 715, 717,
132 N.Y. Supp. 37, 39 (1911), where a question of dealing with customers
arose but no lists were involved. The New York court stated: "All that clearly appears is that he [the former employee] undertook to use in his new employment the knowledge he had acquired in the old. This, if it involves
no breach of confidence, is not unlawful; for equity has no power to compel
a man who changes employers to wipe clean the slate of his memory."
8
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-4 (1960), provides that "no contract or agreement hereafter made, limiting the rights of any person to do business anywhere in the State of North Carolina shall be enforceable unless such agreement is in writing. . .

."

It is submitted that this statute should have no

bearing on cases of this nature. As stated in Colonial Launderies, Inc. v.
Henry, 48 R.I. 332, 334, 138 At. 47, 48 (1927), "equitable jurisdiction ...
does not depend on such an express contract ....

Specific performance of
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put on the definition of customer lists and knowledge as trade secrets
is unknown. A prior confidential relationship would probably be
required. If a narrow view of the dictum in the Kadis case is taken,
it may be indicative that North Carolina would be reluctant to
restrain competitive solicitation where the former employee relies
upon memory alone though the door is left open where the names
remembered were acquired and used in breach of trust. It should
be remembered that there is substantial case authority in other jurisdictions approving the rule that lists remembered are likewise protectable.
DAVID M. CONNOR

Trusts-Rule Against Perpetuities-Class Gifts
In Parker v. Parker1 a testator devised certain property to his
son in trust, the rents and profits therefrom to be used for the education of the son's children in such amounts as the trustee in his
discretion deemed necessary. The trustee was directed to convey
the property to the grandchildren (or grandchild) or to the issue
of any deceased grandchild "when" the youngest grandchild reached
twenty-eight. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the
latter provision violated the Rule Against Perpetuities.
In North Carolina the Rule Against Perpetuities has been
stated as follows: "No devise or grant of a future interest in property
is valid unless title thereto must vest, if at all, not later than twentyone years, plus the period of gestation, after some life or lives in
being at the time of the creation of the interest."' The effect of the
a contract in its true sense is not sought. Prevention of unfair competition
is the reason for seeking equitable interference." This statute should be applicable only to express agreements between the parties, not to what the law
implicitly recognizes as unfair competition. The parties can agree to reasonably limit the employee from competing if such agreement is reduced to
writing and signed by the employee. But the master-servant or agency relationship found in the cases discussed does not limit the employee's right to
compete, but merely the methods that he may use.
1252 N.C. 399, 113 S.E.2d 899 (1960).
Id. at 402, 113 S.E.2d at 902. The North Carolina court often has
incorrectly stated that the interest must vest in not less than twenty-one
years. This has not, however, affected any of the decisions. See Finch v.
Honeycutt, 246 N.C. 91, 97 S.E.2d 478 (1957); McPherson v. First Citizens
Nat'l Bank, 240 N.C. 1, 80 S.E.2d 386 (1954); Fuller v. Hedgpeth, 239
N.C. 370, 80 S.E.2d 18 (1954) ; McQueen v. Branch Banking & Trust Co.,
234 N.C. 737, 68 S.E.2d 831 (1952). The rule is properly stated in the
principal case and 'also in Clarke v. Clarke, 253 N.C. 156, 116 S.E.2d 449
(1960).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

rule is to prescribe the time within which an interest must vest;8

thus the rule will affect only contingent interests. 4 The rule is not
concerned with the postponement of possession,5 with accumulation,'
with suspension of alienation,7 or with duration.' However, the
rule may not be evaded by the creation of a private trust.0 It
applies to the time when the legal interest vests in the trustee, as well
as to the time when the equitable or beneficial interest vests in the
beneficiary."0
The problems presented in the Parker case are of particular
importance to the practicing attorney in that there is an increasing
number of persons who wish to provide in their wills for the establishment of a trust giving the trustee some discretion in the use of
the income in case of unforeseen circumstances and providing for the
distribution of the corpus when the beneficiary attains such age as
the testator thinks necessary for him to be able to intelligently
manage his own affairs. If we assume that such testamentary disposition is a good one and that the testator's intention should be
carried out, it would seem that the gift in the principal case could
have been saved without doing violence to present North Carolina
law.
In order to hold the gift valid in the principal case the court
would have to consider three problems: (1) Is the membership in
'McQueen v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., supra note 2.
'Parker v. Parker, 252 N.C. 399, 113 S.E.2d 899 (1960).
'Fuller v. Hedgpeth, 239 N.C. 370, 80 S.E.2d 18 (1954). See generally
GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS § 513 (2d ed. 1947).
'Goldtree v. Thompson, 79 Cal. 613, 22 Pac. 50 (1889).
Manierre v. Welling, 32 RI. 104, 78 Atl. 507 (1911). See generally 6
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.2 (Casner ed. 1952).
8 Seaver v. Fitzgerald, 141 Mass. 401, 6 N.E. 73 (1886);

McQueen v.
Branch Banking & Trust Co., 234 N.C. 737, 68 S.E.2d 831 (1952). See

generally GRAY, Tin RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 205 (4th ed. 1942);
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 370 (1944); 2 SIMEs, FUTURE INTEREST § 500

(1936). But see American Trust Co. v. Williamson, 228 N.C. 458, 46
S.E.2d 104 (1948), where the North Carolina Supreme Court stated that
the rule limits the duration of private trusts. This statement was repudiated
in McQueen v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., supra. However, language

used by the court in Finch v. Honeycutt, 246 N.C. 91, 97 S.E.2d 478 (1957),
discussed in 36 N.C.L. REv. 467 (1958), may reopen the possibility that
a private trust might be held invalid because full enjoyment is postponed for
an excessive period of time.
' McQueen v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., supra note 8; American
Trust Co. v. Williamson, supra note 8. For a discussion of the effect of the
rule on charitable trusts, see 2 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 352
(1935).
" McQueen v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 234 N.C. 737, 68 S.E.2d 831
(1952).
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the class of grandchildren ascertainable within the period of the
Rule Against Perpetuities? (2) Do the gifts to the grandchildren
vest within the period of the rule? (3) Are the gifts to the issue
of any deceased grandchild (or grandchildren) valid and if not, what
effect does this have on the gift to the grandchildren?
As to the first of these problems, the court interpreted the will
to mean that all the children of the testator's son, including such
children as might be born after the testator's death, were to be
included in the gift. The court then concluded that the class membership was not ascertainable until the termination of the trust. In
so deciding, however, the court failed to consider the grandchildren
as a class separate and distinct from the issue. If the court had
made this distinction, there is respectable authority for holding the
gift valid.
Such a distinction was made in Hill v. Birmingham." In this
case the will establishing the trust provided that the income therefrom was to be used in equal shares for the benefit of the testator's
grandchildren as the trustee, in his discretion, might deem proper.
The principal was to be paid to them in equal shares "when" the
youngest grandchild attained the age of twenty-five. There was a
further provision that if any grandchild should die leaving issue,
his share would go to his issue. In holding that the gift did not
violate the Rule Against Perpetuities the court stated: "No grandchild could be born to the testator later than the time when the
survivor of his son or daughter died, with a possible addition of
nine months representing the period of gestation, and consequently
the class would necessarily close at that time."' 2
Applying the rationale of Hill to the principal case, it would
be impossible for grandchildren to be born more than a nine months
period of gestation after the death of the testator's son whose life
can be taken as the measuring life. The class would close at that
time, and any interest which vested within the period in which
grandchildren could be born would not violate the Rule Against
3
Perpetuities.1
The second problem would be whether the gifts to the grandchildren would vest within the period prescribed by the rule. It is
" 131 Conn. 174, 38 A.2d 604 (1944).
22 Id. at 177, 38 A.2d at 606.
While the court appears to have assumed
that the postponement of enjoyment was valid, the issue was not raised in
the case.
2 See id. at 177, 38 A.2d 607.
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generally held that where a trust gives all or a part of the income
to the beneficiary, with directions to the trustee to divide and deliver
the estate at a stated time in the future, the interest in the estate
vests immediately upon the death of the testator. 14 Conversely,
where there is no gift of the income or the estate distinct from the
division which is to be made equally between all the children upon
the termination of the trust, the "when" of the division marks the
time of the vesting. 5 In applying the latter rule to the facts of the
Parker case the court stated: "[T]here is no bequest of the income
to the class as a whole or to any individual in the class, nor is there
any gift of the corpus apart from the provision for conveyance
per stirpes when the trust has terminated."' 0 In making this statement the court was apparently relying on the rule that a gift of
income must be in specified amounts in order to cause the age
contingency to apply to the payment of the gift rather than to its
vesting. 7 However, the court could have reached an opposite
result by applying the rule that a discretionary trust for the maintenance of a class is effective to vest the otherwise contingent gift.' 8
While the problem of the vesting of the corpus of a discretionary
trust for the maintenance of a class apparently has not arisen in
North Carolina, it has been held that a discretionary gift of income
is effective to cause the immediate vesting of the corpus in the
individual beneficiary. In Jackson v. Langley' 9 property was willed
"'Jackson v. Langley, 234 N.C. 243, 66 S.E.2d 899 (1951); Carter v.

Kempton, 233 N.C. 1, 62 S.E.2d 713 (1950); Sutton v. Quinerly, 228 N.C.
106, 44 S.E.2d 521 (1947); Robinson v. Robinson, 227 N.C. 155, 41 S.E.2d
282 (1947) ; Chas. W. Priddy & Co. v. Sanderford, 221 N.C. 422, 20 S.E.2d
341 (1942); Coddington v. Stone, 217 N.C. 714, 9 S.E.2d 420 (1940);
Weill v. Weill, 212 N.C. 764, 194 S.E.2d 243 (1938).

" Knox v. Knox, 208 N.C. 141, 179 S.E. 610 (1935); Bowen v. Hackney, 136 N.C. 187, 48 S.E. 633 (1904); Fuller v. Fuller, 58 N.C. 223
(1859); Anderson v. Felton, 36 N.C. 55 (1840).
10252

N.C. at 407, 113 S.E.2d at 905.

Paterson Say. Inst. v. De Gray, 136 N.J. Eq. 371, 42 A.2d 264 (Ct. Ch.
1945); In re Helme's Estate, 95 N.J. Eq. 197, 123 Atl. 43 (Prerogative Ct.
1923); In re Mervin, [1891] 3 Ch. 197; In re Parker, 16 Ch. D. 44 (1879);

Lloyd v. Lloyd, 3 K. & J. 20, 69 Eng. Rep. 1005 (Ch. 1856).

" Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Dignan, 105 N.J. Eq. 750, 146 AtI. 466
(Ct. Ch. 1929); Hayes v. Robeson, 29 R.I. 216, 69 Atl. 686 (1908); In re

Williams, [1907] 1 Ch. 180; Fox v. Fox, L.R. 19 Eq. 286 (1875); Harri-

son v. Grimwood, 12 Beav. 192, 50 Eng. Rep. 1033 (Ch. 1849). The court
also found that the language of the will indicated an intent on the part of the

testator to postpone the vesting of the estate until the youngest child reached
-twenty-one. It would appear unlikely, however, that the testator would have
preferred the whole gift to fail rather than be partially effective.
1234

N.C. 243, 66 S.E.2d 889 (1951).
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to a trustee with directions that the net income be applied to the
support and education of the testatrix's son. It was further provided that "when" the beneficiary reached the age of twenty-five all
the property or the remainder thereof was to vest absolutely in him.
In the event certain enumerated emergencies arose the trustee could
use the income from or the corpus of the trust estate for his own
benefit. The court held that the vesting of the estate in the son was
not in any way affected or delayed to any greater extent than if the
trustee had been given a life estate with the power to use any part
of the corpus for his own benefit. The court stated:
The overwhelming weight of authority, including our
own decisions, supports the view that in such cases the estate
vests in the ultimate beneficiary upon the death of the testator,
subject to be divested of such portion thereof as may be required to meet the authorized needs of the life tenant or other
designated person.20
This decision would seem to support the view that in the Parker
case the corpus would vest in the children in esse at the death of the
testator, subject to partial divestment in favor of after born children
or subject to total divestment in the event of death. 2 '
If it is assumed that there is an immediate vesting of the estate
in the children in esse at the testator's death, subject to divestment,
the question arises whether the possibility that such divestment
might take place at a time beyond the permissible period would
invoke the rule. The court in the principal case cited what is
supposedly a split of authority on this problem, first citing authority
for the proposition that a vested gift, though subject to a condition
subsequent, does not come within the rule.2 2 The court then cited
authority for the view that an executory interest is not vested until
the time comes for taking possession.23 As the latter view would
0
Id. at 246, 66 S.E.2d at 901. See In re Sessions Estate, 217 Ore. 340,
2

341 P.2d 512 (1958), where property was left in trust for A, who was
unborn at the time. The trustee was given discretionary power to apply
the income for A's benefit. The corpus was to go to A "when he shall
reach 25." The court held that the estate was vested, subject to divestment.
"1See Pearson v. Dolman, L.R. 3 Eq. 315 (1866), and Scotney v. Lomer,
31 Ch. D. 380 (1883), holding that the fact that the gift of income is
defeasible does not prevent the gift from causing the immediate vesting of
the interests.
22 Shoemaker v. Newman, 65 F.2d 208 (D.C. Cir. 1933) ; In re Friday's
Estate, 313 Pa. 328, 170 Adt. 123 (1933). Compare Congregational Church
Bldg. Soc. v. Everett, 85 Md. 79, 36 Atl. 654 (1897).
" 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.3 (Casner ed. 1952).
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merely invalidate the executory interest of the issue and not effect
the interest of the grandchildren, it is questionable whether it is
really converse.24 Nevertheless, the court could have preserved the
present gift by adopting the former authority.2"
The third question confronting the court would be whether the
gifts to the issue of any deceased grandchild were valid and if not,
what effect, if any, this would have on the gifts to the grandchildren.
The court in the principal case stated in a dictum that if the interests
did vest at the time of the testator's death, they would be subject
to divestment should any of the beneficiaries die before the termination of the trust. The issue of those so dying would take as purchasers under the will.2 6 The court did not, however, attempt to
pass on the validity of the gifts to the issue. The general rule is
that gifts to the issue of grandchildren born after the testator's death
violate the Rule Against Perpetuities and are, therefore, void.27
However, as the gifts to the issue of grandchildren born before the
testator's death will vest at the death of their parents, and as their
parents were lives in being at the time of the testator's death, these
gifts do not violate the rule.2"
Since the gift to the issue of those grandchildren born after the
death of the testator is void, the question arises whether this would
invalidate the gift to the other classes. The prevailing rule is that
even though the gift to one class in a group of classes is void, this
does not invalidate the gift to the remaining classes.29
In summary, the court might have saved the gift in the principal
case by holding: (1) that the class of grandchildren would close
no later than a nine months period of gestation after the death of
the testator's son and the membership of the class would be determined at that time; (2) that the discretionary gift of income
would cause the immediate vesting of the estate in the grandchildren
The interest of the grandchildren would actually be made indefeasible
by the invalidation of the divesting contingency.
" See note 21 supra.
26 252 N.C. at 405, 113 S.E.2d at 903 (1960).
" Lamkin v. Hines Lumber Co., 158 Ga. 785, 124 S.E. 694 (1924);
Bowerman v. Taylor, 126 Md. 203, 94 Atl. 652 (1915) ; Hill v. Simmons, 125
Mass. 536 (1878).
28 Shepard v. Union & New Haven Trust Co., 106 Conn. 627, 138 Atl.
809 (1927); Turner v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 148 Md. 372, 129 Atl.
294 (1925); Dorr v. Lovering, 147 Mass. 530, 18 N.E. 412 (1888).
29 Bowerman v. Taylor, 126 Md. 203, 94 Atl. 652 (1915); Hill v. Simmons, 125 Mass. 536 (1878) ; Cattlin v. Brown, 11 Hare. 372, 68 Eng. Rep.
1319 (Eq. 1853).
2
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NOTES AND COMMENTS

in esse at the testator's death; (3) that the gift to the issue of the
grandchildren born before the testator's death would be valid as
their parents were lives in being at the testator's death; and (4) that
although the gift to the issue of those grandchildren born after the
testator's death would be void, this would not invalidate the gifts
to the other classes.
Various attempts have been made to abolish the common law
Rule Against Perpetuities either by judicial ° or legislative3 ' action.
Although some of these statutes were ill-fated, there seems to be
a present tendency to adopt laws which eliminate some of the harsh
effects of the rule. 33 While these statutes employ varied language,
they are basically consistent. In eight states34 the statutes apply to
both real and personal property. In six states35 they apply to both
equitable and legal interest. In five states30 they provide that the
period of the rule should be measured by actual rather than possible
events. In four states 37 they apply the principle of cy pres.
The Vermont statute3 8 is applicable to both personalty and realty
"0Story v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 115 Fla. 436, 156 So. 101
(1934), applied the rule on the basis of facts which actually did occur, not
those which might have occurred. Edgerly v. Barker, 66 N.H. 434, 31 Ati.
900 (1891), avoided the rule by applying the principle of cy pres to the
will81in question.
E.g., Ky. REv. STAT. §§381.215 -.223 (1960); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
27, § 501 (1959).
3 Connecticut, Indiana, Ohio and Wyoming repealed their statutes.
This, according to Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's
Reign of Terror, 65 HARV. L. Rnv. 721 (1952), was due to the fact that
they were "hopelessly vague."
"E.g., Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §45-95 (1958); Kentucky:
Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 381.215 -.223 (1960); Maine: ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch.
160, § 27 (Supp. 1959) ; Maryland: Mi. CODE ANN. art. 16, § 197A (1960) ;
Massachusetts: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184A, § 1 (1955); New York:
N.Y. SEss. LAWS 1960, ch. 448; Pennsylvania: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
§ 301.4(b) (1950) ; Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 501 (1959) ; Washi1gton: WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.050 (Supp. 1959).
" Connecticut, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York,
Pennsylvania and Vermont.
Connecticut, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts and Vermont.
"Kentucky, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Vermont and Washington. Connecticut, Maine and Massachusetts measure the periods of the rule by actual
events
only if the interest is to take place after lives in being.
"7 Kentucky, New York, Vermont and Washington.
"The Vermont statute reads in part: "Any interest in real or personal
property which would violate the rule against perpetuities shall be reformed,
within the limits of the rule, to approximate most closely the intention of
the creator of the interest. In determining whether an interest would violate
said rule and in reforming an interest the period of perpetuities shall be
measured by actual rather than by possible events." VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
27, § 501 (1959).
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and incorporates both the doctrine of cy pres and the policy of measuring the period of the rule by actual rather than possible events.
It is submitted that the North Carolina legislature should adopt
such a statute. 9
JERRY W. AmOS
s Until such a statute is adopted by the legislature, the lawyer drawing
a will in North Carolina would be well advised to see the saving clause suggested in Leach & Logan, Perpetuities:A Standard Saving Clause to Avoid
Violations of the Rule, 74 HARv. L. Rnv. 1141 (1961).

